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 ABSTRACT 
  
The lowering of rates for consumers and the continuing reliability of service were two 
of the major goals that the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) sought to 
achieve when it restructured the New York electricity industry in the late 1990s.  This 
thesis seeks to gain insights into just how successful industry deregulation has been in 
achieving these goals.  To investigate the lowering of rates for consumers, this thesis 
examines the evolution of the “average cost per ultimate consumer kWh.”  Upon 
finding that costs have not fallen since deregulation, we subsequently decompose them 
into three components: (i) capacity markets and other add-ons, (ii) wholesale prices, 
and (iii) distribution costs.  We then attempt to identify possible causes behind the 
evolution of each of the three components.  The analysis is focused on three major 
New York electricity distribution companies:  New York State Electric & Gas 
Corporation (NYSEG); Niagara Mohawk (NiMo); and Consolidated Edison Company 
of New York (ConEd).  Our analysis suggests that incentive regulation has not had a 
substantial impact on reducing distribution costs; that the Installed Capacity market 
(ICAP) is creating a large premium over wholesale costs in the New York City Area; 
and that rising fuel costs have been a major factor in the increase in the wholesale 
price of electricity.  To investigate the effect deregulation has had on the reliability of 
the system, we examine the integration of the New York Electricity Market by 
estimating the pair-wise relationships between day-ahead zonal price data.  As 
reliability and competition are maximized when the pool market is integrated, the 
insights that this thesis provides into when and how the New York electricity market 
segments offer useful information for policy makers. The analysis indicates that the 
overall market is becoming more segmented over time, and that the main locations of 
the segmentation are between zones C and G, and G and J. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
In the mid 1990s New York State, motivated by some of the highest electricity prices 
in the United States, began its march towards industry restructuring--- a journey that 
the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) believed would result in the 
lowering of rates for consumers1 and continuing reliability of service.2   More than a 
decade later, a number of authors have questioned just how successful industry 
restructuring has been in achieving these goals.  For example, Apt (2005) calculates 
the annual rate of industrial price change in New York State and finds that prices have 
risen 4.3% since restructuring, compared to a 1% decrease in the 8 years prior. The 
New York State price history from his study for residential, industrial and commercial 
consumers is presented in Figure 1.1.  The results pertaining to the annual rate of 
change in price for New York residential consumers have been similarly disappointing 
--- as witnessed by the upward trending middle line in Figure 1.1.  Apt (2005) also 
compares the price changes in states that have deregulated, with the counterfactual, 
states that have not, and concludes “there is no correlation between restructuring or 
regulation and improvement in the annual rate of price change.” (p. 3)3 
                                                 
1 From page 28 of Opinion 96-12 State of New York Public Service Commission (1996): “Lowering 
Rates for Consumers:  Market forces overall are expected to produce, over time, rates that will be 
lower than they would be under a regulated environment. As we move toward competition, our 
expectation is that rates overall will be reduced.” 
2 From page 28 of Opinion 96-12 State of New York Public Service Commission (1996): “Continuing 
Reliability of Service: In order to protect all consumers, any new system involving competition in the 
generation sector must have reliability of the bulk power system as a top priority, including an 
independent system operator (ISO) that must have the authority and means to continue to provide this 
reliability.” 
3 While such studies provide a useful overview of the impact of deregulation on prices, they are 
dependent on having an accurate counterfactual --- a challenging task due to the idiosyncrasies that are 
present across states.  
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Similarly, the 2003 Northeast blackout, in which approximately 50 million people lost 
power and caused estimated outage-related financial losses of between 4 and 6 billion 
USD,4 provides stark, albeit anecdotal, evidence on reliability.  Additional evidence 
on the state of reliability is provided by the falling reserve margins in New York State 
(see Figure 1.2) According to the 2005 New York Independent System Operator’s 
(NYISO) forecast, the New York Control Area will fall below the 18% summer 
reserve margin which is needed to meet the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) reliability margin of 18% (fail less than 1 day in 10 years) in 
2008.  Furthermore, in 2007 NYISO approved a second ‘Reliability Needs 
Assessment’ (RNA).5  It concluded that “…generation and transmission resources on 
New York’s bulk electricity grid are expected to be adequate though 2010.  Power 
deficiencies, primarily in the state’s southeast region, could occur by 2011 and 
become acute by 2016 if expected demand isn’t addressed by then.” The RNA report’s 
specific concern about the southeast region is complemented by a recent empirical 
study by Mount and Ju (2006) who showed using principal component analysis that 
over the last few years the highly populated New York City Area has become more 
segmented from the rest of New York State Market.  As we will explain later, the 
degree of segmentation present in a pool market is thought to be inversely related to 
both reliability and the level of competition that is present in the market. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, “Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the 
United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations.” April 2004. http://www.ferc.gov/  
5 “The NYISO Issues Second Reliability Needs Assessment”, News Release, New York Independent 
System Operator, March 19, 2007. 
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Figure 1.1: New York State Prices (with seasonal adjustments) in U.S. cents/kWh 
Key: Residential (top line), Commercial (middle line), Industrial (bottom line).  
Source: Apt (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  Forecasted Summer Reserve Margin for the New York Control Area 
Key:  Reserve Margin is the amount of Installed Capacity above the Forecasted 
Peak Load (%).  NYISO standard --- A reserve margin of 18% is needed to meet 
NERC reliability (Fail <1 day in 10 years).  Source: NYISO PowerTrends 
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1.2 Overview 
This thesis seeks to gain insights into the progress New York State has made towards 
the PSC’s aforementioned goals for industry restructuring.  It is structured as follows: 
 
First in Chapter 2 we provide a general history of the New York electricity market in 
order to set the scene for what is to follow. We pay special attention to explaining the 
motivation behind industry deregulation and the circumstances which lead to the 
creation of stranded assets. The divestiture of generation capacity by regulated 
incumbents is documented. This chapter also explores the implementation of the 
wholesale market price cap, which aims to mitigate price spikes caused by market 
power, and the Installed Capacity market (ICAP), which aims to stimulate generation 
investment.  The ICAP market operates in parallel with New York’s wholesale 
electricity spot and day-ahead markets and will play an important part in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
In Chapter 3 we focus on the progress toward lowering rates for consumers.  While 
many studies examine the competitiveness of the wholesale spot market, it is 
important to realize that the absence of market power in the wholesale market does not 
guarantee the achievement of low retail prices for consumers. The formation of the 
price ultimately paid by consumers is reliant on the interplay between three sectors -- 
generation, transmission and distribution, and retail -- and supplementary markets, like 
the Installed Capacity market (ICAP). Thus to gain a more complete picture of the 
progress toward the lowering of rates faced by consumers we analyze the behavior of 
the “average cost to consumers per kWh” (a proxy for retail prices) for three major 
New York electricity distribution companies [New York State Electric & Gas 
Corporation (NYSEG); Niagara Mohawk (NiMo); and Consolidated Edison Company 
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of New York (ConEd)] over the period 1985 – 2005.  In particular, we decompose 
“average cost to consumers per kWh” into three components: (i) wholesale, (ii) 
capacity markets and other add-ons, and (iii) distribution costs. We then attempt to 
identify possible causes behind the evolution of each of the three components. 
 
The second part of our analysis is presented in Chapter 4.  In this chapter we focus on 
whether the PSC’s second major goal, to maintain the reliability of service, has been 
achieved.  To do this we examine the segmentation of the New York State Electricity 
market from 2001 to 2005 using pair-wise correlation analysis --- an empirical 
approach that measures market integration using the classical economic definition of a 
market.6  Our interest in the segmentation of the market is twofold.  Firstly, it provides 
insight into the reliability of the system over time.  When a market is often segmented, 
the system operator has fewer generators to dispatch and thus the region is more 
vulnerable to outages due to the greater probability that supply will not be sufficient to 
meet load.  The aforementioned 2003 Northeast blackout is a dramatic example of a 
transmission based outage.7  Secondly, the degree of segmentation in the market also 
provides insights into the competitiveness of the wholesale market ---  which is 
relevant to PSC’s goal of lowering rates for consumers.  Given the number of firms in 
a pool market, competition is maximized if there are no transmission constraints8 or 
other phenomena that segment the market. This ensures that every firm competes with 
                                                 
6 The classical economic definition of a market was advocated by Marshall (1961) when he stated that 
“the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for the same price to be paid for the 
same thing at the same time in all parts of the market: but of course if the market is large, allowance 
must be made for the expense of delivering the goods to different purchasers.”  See Section 4.1 for a 
more detailed discussion of correlation analysis.  
7  Other examples of transmission based blackouts include:  23 September 2003 when over 4 million 
homes and businesses in Denmark and Sweden lost power for four hours; 28 August 2003 when an 
estimated 400,000 people were without power in London; and 28 September 2003 when 57 million 
people were affected by a blackout in Italy. 
8 Transmission constraints occur when a line between parts of the network cannot transmit any more 
electricity. 
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every other firm, which lessens the chances that market power can be exercised. 
Conversely, if the market becomes segmented, decreased competition may result due 
to the diminished market contestability and the consequent increase in concentration 
of ownership and control.  The analysis in Chapter 4 is specifically concentrated on 
the pair-wise relationships between Zone J (New York City), A (West), C (Central) 
and G (Hudson Valley), over off peak trading period 6 (5:00-6:00 a.m.) and peak 
trading period 18 (5:00-6:00 p.m.).  We are particularly interested in identifying the 
geographical dispersion of segmentation and gaining insights into whether the New 
York electricity market, with its alleged “third-world electricity grid,” 9 is becoming 
less integrated over time. 
 
 
Box 1.1:  Description of the Selected New York Distribution Companies    
SOURCE: Collected from the 2004 10-K annual report filings publicly available on 
SECInfo.com 
 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation (NYSEG) --- Subsidiary of Energy East 
“NYSEG's principal business consists of its regulated electricity transmission and 
distribution operations and its regulated natural gas transportation, storage and 
distribution operations in upstate New York. NYSEG also generates electricity 
primarily from its several hydroelectric stations. NYSEG serves approximately 
854,000 electricity and 254,000 natural gas customers in its service territory of 
approximately 20,000 square miles. The service territory, 99% of which is located 
outside the corporate limits of cities, is in the central, eastern and western parts of the 
State of New York and has a population of approximately 2.5 million. The larger cities 
in which NYSEG serves both electricity and natural gas customers are Binghamton, 
Elmira, Auburn, Geneva, Ithaca and Lockport. Approximately 78% of NYSEG's 
operating revenues for 2004 and 2003 and 82% for 2002 were derived from electricity 
sales, with the balance each year derived from natural gas sales. No customer accounts 
for more than 5% of either electric or natural gas revenues.” 
 
 
Continued on next page… 
                                                 
9 The statement “A superpower with a third-world electricity grid” was made in response to the New 
York Blackout by Bill Richardson, the New Mexico governor and former head of the Department of 
Energy, 2003.  
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Box 1.1 (cont.):  Description of the Selected New York Distribution Companies    
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (now "National Grid”) 
“Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the Company) was organized in 1937 under 
the laws of New York State and is engaged principally in the regulated energy 
delivery business in New York State. The Company provides electric service to 
approximately 1,600,000 electric customers in the areas of eastern, central, northern 
and western New York and sells, distributes, and transports natural gas to 
approximately 562,000 gas customers in areas of central, northern and eastern New 
York.  On January 31, 2002, Niagara Mohawk Holdings, Inc. (Holdings), the parent 
company of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation became a wholly owned subsidiary 
of National Grid USA (National Grid). National Grid is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
National Grid Transco plc (NGT)….Although the Company has exited the generation 
business, the Company must still arrange for electric supply through a transition 
period and as provider of last resort, in that the Company will provide electricity and 
gas to its customers who are unable or unwilling to obtain an alternative supplier 
(which accounts for approximately 93% of the Company’s customers). The Company 
purchases energy from various suppliers under long-term Purchase Power Agreements 
(PPAs) and purchases any additional power needs on the open market through the 
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)…. As of March 31, 2004, the 
Company had approximately 52,000 pole miles of transmission and distribution lines 
for electric delivery.” 
 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York 
“Con Edison of New York, incorporated in New York State in 1884, is a subsidiary of 
Con Edison and has no significant subsidiaries of its own. Con Edison of New York 
provides electric service in all of New York City (except part of Queens) and most of 
Westchester County, an approximately 660 square mile service area with a population 
of more than nine million…. Con Edison of New York’s principal business segments 
are its regulated electric, gas and steam businesses. In 2004, electric, gas and steam 
operating revenues were 77 percent, 16 percent and 7 percent, respectively, of its 
operating revenues. Electric operating revenues were $6 billion in 2004 or 77 percent 
of Con Edison of New York’s operating revenues. The percentages were 78 and 80 
percent, respectively, in the two preceding years. In 2004, 55 percent of the electricity 
delivered by Con Edison of New York in its service areas was sold by the company to 
its full-service customers, 45 percent was sold by other suppliers, including Con 
Edison Solutions, an unregulated subsidiary of Con Edison, to the company’s 
customers under its electric retail access program and the balance was delivered to the 
state and municipal customers of the New York Power Authority (NYPA) and the 
economic development customers of municipal electric agencies. (p.10-11)… Con 
Edison of New York is primarily a ‘wires and pipes’ energy delivery company that: 
has sold most of its electric generating capacity; provides its customers the 
opportunity to buy electricity and gas from other suppliers; purchases most of the 
electricity and all of the gas it sells to its full-service customers (the cost of which is 
recovered pursuant to provisions approved by the PSC); and provides energy delivery 
services to customers pursuant to rate provisions approved by the PSC.” (p.14) 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION IN NEW YORK STATE 
 
2.1 The Path to Deregulation 
Prior to deregulation, the New York State electricity industry was highly vertically 
integrated --- consisting of seven major utility companies: Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York; Central Hudson Gas & Electric; Long Island Lighting 
Company; New York State Electric and Gas Corporation; Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corporation; Orange and Rockland Utilities; and Rochester Gas and Electric 
Corporation.10  Each utility was responsible for the supply of electricity within its 
service territory, with the mutually exclusivity of these territories ensuring that each 
utility was a monopoly supplier.11 Because of this, utilities were heavily regulated to 
counteract their monopoly urge to overprice and under-produce.  ‘Rate of return 
regulation’ was the New York Public Utility Commission’s preferred regulatory 
approach until the mid 1990s.  Under this regulatory regime the price the regulated 
utility can charge consumers is set by the regulatory authority, the State of New York 
Public Service Commission (PSC). Note that ‘rate of return regulation’ is sometimes 
confused with ‘price cap regulation’. While both stipulate the prices a regulated firm 
may charge for its products, rate of return regulation does this by setting the price of 
each product individually, whereas under price cap regulation a cap is set for a basket 
of goods --- thus allowing more price flexibility. Rate of return regulation’s somewhat 
                                                 
10 While the utilities owned generation, power was also purchased from non-utility generators and other 
regulated utilities. 
11 Note that dual franchise areas did exist, but they were extremely rare.  See Pechman (1993) for a 
discussion on the configuration of the New York Investor Owner Utilities service territories.  
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misleading name comes from the procedure to find the stipulated prices.  Prices are set 
in order to ensure the firm can earn a fair rate of return on its agreed upon rate base.12 
 
The mid 1990s saw rising disquiet over persistently high electricity prices.  Industrial 
lobby groups argued that the high electricity prices were damaging the 
competitiveness of New York-based businesses, leading to an exodus of firms, and 
consequently job losses. Many blamed the high prices on the regulated utilities’ 
inflated rate bases, due to stranded assets 13  incurred by utilities building what in 
hindsight turned out to be uneconomic generation facilities and entering into high 
priced long-term contracts with independent suppliers in the 1970s and 80s.14  The 
primary initiator of asset stranding was the greatly inflated price of oil in the 1970s 
and 80s --- a result of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises.15  During these periods the real 
world price per barrel of oil increased from $3 in 1972 to $32 USD in 1980. 16  
Furthermore some experts predicted future prices to top $80 USD in the United States. 
These high prices and wildly inflated price expectations would have a profound effect 
on the New York State electricity market for decades to come.  Firstly, at the firm 
level, the high price of oil and fears over its supply meant that in the 1970s and 1980s 
many existing utilities sought to diversify their electricity generation portfolios away 
                                                 
12 See Guthrie (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the differences between ‘rate of return’ and 
‘price cap’ regulation.  
13 Asset stranding occurs when investments have become uneconomic before the end of their physical 
lives. 
14 In 1997 the Public Service Commission estimated the cost of buying out these over priced, state 
ordered contracts to be $10.6 billion (Perez-Pena, 1997b). 
15 The 1970’s had heralded a turbulent era in world energy markets.  First in 1973, the first oil crisis 
began when members of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) began an 
embargo on oil exports to the United States, who had continued to support Israel during the Yom 
Kippur War, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel used its market 
power to further increase prices.  Then in 1979, the second oil crisis occurred when the US favored 
Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution of Iran.  He was 
replaced by Shi`i Muslim cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini.  
16  Source: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 1997, DOE/EIA-0384(97). 
(Washington, DC, July 1998), Table 5.19. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/AOMC/7079.html 
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from oil.  An obvious candidate was nuclear power, which at current and projected 
electricity prices had become economically viable.  Secondly at the federal level, the 
1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was passed by the United States 
Congress.  The legislation, enacted to reduce the United States’ dependence on foreign 
oil in an attempt to insulate the United States economy from the predicted high oil 
prices, forced existing utilities to buy from new ‘non utility’ generators that were not 
oil dependent.17 Interestingly, PURPA was not enforced by federal agencies. Rather it 
was up to individual states to implement it, which New York State emphatically did, 
requiring utilities to sign long term contracts with non utility generators and enacting 
regulations that exceeded the obligations under PURPA (Joskow, 2000).  The high 
prices expectations of the late 70s and early 80s did not materialize, as oversupply saw 
the price of oil steadily decreased to under $20 by 1985. This left many utilities 
holding long term contacts (20-30 years) that required them to purchase electricity at 
prices far above cost, and owning inefficient generation that were not longer 
economically viable.  The situation was also made worse by large cost overruns on 
many of the nuclear generation projects.18 
 
For major industrial users, deregulation, with its considerable success in the long 
distance telecommunications and airline industries, offered hope of a fresh start free of 
these stranded assets and inefficient generation.  In 1993, the PSC began to publicly 
investigate the deregulation of the New York State electricity industry. 19   This 
heralded the start of a highly consultative process, with input solicited from both the 
                                                 
17 This also could be seen as the electricity industries’ first foray into competition. 
18 Section 2.2 provides a detailed description of the stranded costs of the three utilities we examine. 
19 Case 94-E-0952 (previously titled 93-M-0229 “Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Address 
Competitive Opportunities Available to Customers of Electric and Gas Service and Develop Criteria for 
Utility Responses”) 
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public20 and major interest groups.21  Industry lobbyists also had some unlikely allies, 
with various environmental groups also favoring deregulation, believing it would lead 
to an increase in consumers ‘green power’ choices. 22   In late 1994, industry 
deregulation received another boost, with the election of pro-deregulation candidate 
Mr. George E. Pataki as Governor of New York. Pataki had campaigned on a platform 
of lowering electricity prices and halting job losses.23 The next three years would see a 
flurry of activity directed towards the deregulation of the industry. On June 7th 1995, 
the New York Public Service Commission issued Opinion No. 95-7 on Case 94-E-
0952, which outlined the principles to "form the basis for the development of a 
framework for movement toward a more competitive electric marketplace.”  The 
following year on May 20th 1996 the PSC issued Opinion No. 96-122 on Case 94-E-
0952, 24  which outlined the six major goals for deregulation.  These included: 1) 
lowering rates for consumers; 2) increasing customer choice; 3) continuing reliability 
of service; 4) continuing programs that are in the public interest; 5) allaying concerns 
about market power; and 6) continuing customer protections and the obligation to 
serve.25 
 
                                                 
20 Public input was solicited via the Public Involvement Program, Public Statement Hearings, as well as 
a website and an 800 phone line. 
21 Major Interest Groups included: industrial and large commercial consumers; residential and small 
commercial consumers; investor-owned utilities; labor unions; publicly-owned utilities; competitors 
(independent power producers and energy service companies); environmentalists; department of public 
service staff, and other public agencies.   
22  Most consumers in New York State are now able to purchase electricity produced using 
environmentally-friendly electricity generation through various green energy service companies.  Such 
green energy service companies include: Agway Energy Services, Community Energy, Inc., ConEdison 
Solutions, EarthKind Energy, Inc., Energetix, Inc., EnviroGen, and NYSEG Solutions, Inc.  More 
information can be found on:   
http://www.askpsc.com/askpsc/page/?PageAction=renderPageById&PageId=a8022193f892947a1d26b
67506005183  
23 Pataki narrowly defeated three-term incumbent Democratic Governor Mario Cuomo. 
24 For more information see: http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/Incentives/NY11R.pdf  
25 See Box 2.1.for a more detailed description of each goal.  
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To achieve these goals the PSC envisaged having, where possible, competitive 
generation and retail markets, together with regulated transmission and distribution 
networks.26 This industry structure is consistent with standard microeconomic theory, 
which tells us that an industry which is a natural monopoly27 should be provided by 
one firm, hence taking advantage of the economics of scale, and that this firm should 
be subject to regulation, in order to prevent the abuse of market power;28  in industries 
that are not natural monopolies, the superior incentives which competitive forces can 
provide to increase efficiency are often preferred, leading to the promotion of 
competition through divestiture and/or industry entry.  The complication for New 
York State was that the incumbent monopoly utility companies29 were a vertically 
integrated mixture of a natural monopoly (local distribution networks) and non-natural 
monopoly production and service (generation and retail).  Thus to achieve the PSC-
preferred industry structure, the incumbent utilities needed to be persuaded to divest 
their generation assets, and focus their business primarily on their local distribution 
networks (i.e. effectively become distribution companies).  Such a divestiture, 
combined with the creation of a competitive wholesale market operated by an 
independent system operator, 30 would help facilitate a competitive generation sector.  
The distribution companies would then be regulated using modern incentive 
regulation, and retail competition would be encouraged through requirements that the 
                                                 
26 Appendix C of Case 94-E-0952 provides an overview of the recommended industry structure. 
27 A natural monopoly is “an industry in which one firm can achieve economies of scale over the entire 
range of market supply” (Schiller, 2002 --- Glossary). 
28 An unregulated natural monopolist raises price above, and produces less than, those which would be 
observed in a competitive market --- thus creating a deadweight loss to society. 
29 Consolidated Edison Company of New York; Central Hudson Gas & Electric; Long Island Lighting 
Company; New York State Electric and Gas Corporation; Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Orange 
and Rockland Utilities; and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation. 
30 The New York Independent System Operator NYISO was formed on the 1st December 1999.  It is a  
‘not-for-profit’ corporation regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
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incumbent distribution companies allow new entrant retail firms, or energy service 
companies (ESCO’s), access to their local distribution infrastructure.31 
 
Box 2.1 New York Public Service Commission’s Goals for Deregulation  
SOURCE: OPINION NO. 96-12 CASES 94-E-0952 p. 29-30. 
 
1. Lowering Rates for Consumers: Market forces overall are expected to produce, over 
time, rates that will be lower than they would be under a regulated environment. As 
we move toward competition, our expectation is that rates overall will be reduced. 
2. Increasing Customer Choice: Increased customer choice among types of services 
and prices to be paid should mean allowing customers throughout the State the 
opportunity to choose among a number of suppliers (such as generators and energy 
service companies (ESCOs)) of electricity and other services. Customers will also be 
able to choose to lower their levels of electric service in return for economic benefits. 
3. Continuing Reliability of Service: In order to protect all consumers, any new system 
involving competition in the generation sector must have reliability of the bulk power 
system as a top priority, including an independent system operator (ISO) that must 
have the authority and means to continue to provide this reliability. An example of this 
is interruptible electric service, that could be tailor-made to an individual customer’s 
desires. 
4. Continuing Programs that are in the Public Interest: We have the responsibility to 
ensure that electric service is provided safely, cleanly, and efficiently. This 
responsibility may entail continuing specific measures to preserve certain programs 
such as energy efficiency, research and development, environmental protections, and 
low-income beyond what competitive markets provide. 
5. Allaying Concerns About Market Power: No competitor or group of competitors 
should be able to exercise undue market power over other competitors either because 
of market power at another stage of production (vertical market power) or because of 
dominance at the same stage of production (horizontal market power). The clearest 
way to preclude vertical market power is to have divestiture of (1) generation, (2) 
transmission and distribution, and (3) energy services. Horizontal market power can be 
avoided by ensuring that a sufficient number of independent competitors participate in 
the market. 
6. Continuing Customer Protections and the Obligation to Serve: Statutory 
requirements make clear that our mandate is to ensure that all New Yorkers have 
access to safe and reliable service at just and reasonable rates. Each customer must be 
able to count on at least one supplier who will continue to provide service at 
reasonable rates in the event that (a) the customer chooses to make no change from its 
current situation, (b) a new supplier fails to meet its obligations, or (c) competitive 
alternatives are not yet available in the area. 
                                                 
31 This unbundling of networks allows ESCO’s to compete at the retail level with the incumbent 
distribution company without the burden of unnecessarily duplicating the incumbent’s network.   
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In order to facilitate the transition to PSC’s preferred industry structure, Opinion No. 
96-122 on Case 94-E-0952 ordered Consolidated Edison Company of New York and 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation (as well as Orange and Rockland 
Utilities; Rochester Gas and Electric; and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation) 
to file proposed plans for rate/restructuring no later than October 1, 1996. 32   A 
description of what utility companies were asked to provide in these restructuring 
plans is presented in Box 2.2. 
 
 
Box 2.2:  Description of What the Filings Ordered by the PSC Should Address at 
a Minimum 
SOURCE: Opinion No. 96-122 (p. 82 and 83) 
 
1. The structure of the utility both in the short and long term, the schedule and cost to 
attain that structure, a description of how that structure complies with our vision and, 
in cases where divestiture of generation is not proposed, effective mechanisms that 
adequately address resulting market power concerns; 
2. A schedule for the introduction of retail access to all of the utility’s customers, and 
a set of unbundled tariffs that is consistent with the retail access program; 
3. A rate plan to be effective for a significant portion of the transition that incorporates 
our goal of moving to a competitive market, including mechanisms to reduce rates and 
address strandable costs; 
4. Identification of the public policy programs, whose funding is not recoverable in a 
competitive market, that need special rate treatment and competitively neutral 
mechanisms to recover such costs; 
5. An examination of the load pockets unique to the utility, identification of potential 
market power problems, and proposals to mitigate market power; and 
6. A plan for the provision of energy services, including addressing the continued 
provision of customer protections consistent with an emerging competitive market. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32   Niagara Mohawk was dealt with in other proceedings and had already submitted its ‘Power Choice’ 
plan. 
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2.2 Deregulation by Negotiation 
Over the next year the PSC negotiated individually with each of the major utility 
companies in order to deregulate the industry.  The non-legislative approach to 
deregulation adopted by the PSC was a departure from the typical state legislation path 
used by the likes of California, and was pursued due to the partisan nature of politics 
in Albany at the time. Pataki, a Republican, would have needed legislation passed in 
each house of the New York State Legislature (Assembly and Senate) before he could 
sign it into law.  At the time the Assembly was under Democratic control, meaning 
that any legislation would have likely needed major alterations in order to pass --- 
something Pataki was not willing to do.  A summary of the PSC restructuring orders 
for Consolidated Edison, NYSEG and Niagara Mohawk can be found in Box 2.3. 
 
While the non-legislative approach avoided the ‘watered down’ legislation criticisms 
that were leveled at California, it did have a major drawback. With the PSC unsure of 
its legal footing during the negotiation process, the utilities gained negotiating 
power.33  Consequently, the PSC’s early aggressive stance softened in order to avoid 
an uncertain, and possibly lengthy, litigated outcome.” 34  While the subsequent 
settlements with the utilities ensured deregulation of the industry was possible, they 
received criticism regarding the distribution of rate cuts and the treatment of stranded 
assets.  For example, the original settlement, for Consolidated Edison gave industrial 
users a 25% rate cut compared to only 3.3% for consumers.35   This lead to criticism 
that the negotiated rate cuts heavily favored industrial customers and that residential 
                                                 
33 “The commission was never sure it has the legal authority to order such changes  -- the utilities 
threatened to tie the state up with litigation for years if it tried” (Perez-Pena, 1999, p.37). 
34 “We [State of New York Public Service Commission] stated our "strong interest in expeditiously 
negotiated resolutions of the individual utility filings" and expressed our preference for a negotiated 
resolution over a litigated outcome.” [OPINION NO. 98-6 p.3].   
35 The original settlement was signed on March 12, 1997. 
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and commercial consumers were effectively subsidizing job creation in the state.36  
The following quote from the Consolidated 1997 Rate Case hearing is indicative of the 
views of many commercial and residential consumers: “The most common concerns 
expressed included: the proposed rate decreases for residential and small business 
customers are too low, with some consumers advocating across-the-board rate 
reductions…”37 The reasoning behind the PSC division of rate cuts was given in 
OPINION NO. 98-6 p.22 where it was argued that “the rate plan is intended to 
promote jobs and economic development by reducing rates for large industrial and 
commercial customers to a level approaching the national average.” They also argued 
that had they “apportioned the revenue reduction equally among all classes, 
customers other than large industrial and commercial customers would have realized 
a minimal gain, while the laudatory goal of promoting job growth and economic 
development would have been lost.” (p.40) On June 20th, 1997 Administrative Law 
Judge Judith Lee, while praising the settlement as “an extraordinary step toward 
resolution of complicated and contentious issues recommendation”, recommended that 
“it would be preferable, even in light of the policy goals encouraging economic 
development, for the gap between reductions for industrial customers and residential 
customers to be smaller than it is under the Settlement, resulting in a more gradual 
correction in rate disparity.” 38  She also recommended that continued discussions 
between the parties should take place.  A revised settlement, which was adopted in 
                                                 
36 Sheldon Silver, the Speaker of the New York Assembly, tried unsuccessfully to shift control of the 
deregulation process back to the New York State Legislature.  According to Perez-Pena (1997a) Mr. 
Silver argued “that the Public Service Commission, left to act on its own, will not pass along enough 
savings to ordinary consumers.”  He also was in favor of utilities absorbing a greater share of the 
stranded costs (Perez-Pena, 1997a). 
37 Consolidated Edison Rate Case 1997: Consumer Input.   
38 CASE 96-E-0897 http://www.dps.state.ny.us/conedsettle.htm  
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November 3, 1997, saw promised savings for commercial, general service customers, 
residential and small business increased to 10 percent by the end of fifth year. 39,40 
 
Box 2.3: Summary of PSC Restructuring Orders for Consolidated Edison, 
NYSEG and Niagara Mohawk 
SOURCE:  This information is reproduced from Public Utilities Fortnightly Magazine 
“PSC Restructuring Orders”, Bruce W. Radford, May 15, 1998.  
http://www.pur.com/pubs/2962.cfm  
 
CONSOLIDATED EDISON OF NEW YORK, INC. RETAIL CHOICE: Begins June 
1, 1998, for 500 MW of load; up to 1,000 MW by April 1, 1999; additional 1,000 MW 
by April 1, 2000; full implementation by Dec. 31, 2001, or when state achieves full 
operation of independent system operator, whichever comes first. SAVINGS: 
Immediate 25-percent rate cut for large industrial customers with monthly demand 
above 1,500 kW; 10-percent for commercial and general service customers (+1,500 
kW) over 5 years; 10-percent for residential and small business by end of fifth year. 
Prior rate increases waived. Total savings between $1 billion and $1.5 billion over 5 
years. DIVESTITURE: Company to sell at least 50 percent of in-city generating 
capacity; process was to begin by mid-April for 30 percent within 90 days. (Sell-off 
plan OK'd, Jan. 14, 1998, Case 96-E-0897, 183 PUR4th 159.) RETURN ON 
EQUITY: Approves 10.9 percent, with sharing of excess earnings triggered at 12.9 
percent. OTHER: Plan expands company's Business Incentive Rate, making 65 MW 
available at reduced rates to encourage businesses to locate in ConEd's service 
territory. See, Case 96-E-0897, Opinion No. 97-16, Nov. 3, 1997 (N.Y.P.S.C.). 
 
NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC & GAS CORP. RETAIL CHOICE: Begins Aug. 1, 
1999 for all customers. SAVINGS: Large industrials get 5-percent annual rate cuts 
over 5 years. Rates frozen for residential and small commercial classes for 4 years, 
with 5-percent cut in fifth year. Overall customer savings put at $725 million ($522 
million from foregone rate increases). Generation backout credit equals 3.23 cents per 
kWh through July 31, 2000; 3.47 cents until July 31, 2001; then 3.71 cents through 
end of settlement. DIVESTITURE: Company must sell its coal-fired generating plants 
by multi-round auction process by Aug. 1, 1999. Proceeds above book value will 
mitigate nuclear stranded costs; company may retain 20 percent of gain from 
renegotiation and/or termination of above-market purchased power contracts. 
RETURN ON EQUITY: Earnings above 9 percent return on equity trigger sharing 
with ratepayers. Cap imposed at 12 percent (all excess earnings go to customers). 
OTHER: Includes about $40 million in funding for system benefits charge for energy 
efficiency and public policy programs. See, Case 96-E-0891, Opinion No. 98-6, 
March 5, 1998 (N.Y.P.S.C.).      Continued on next page…. 
                                                 
39 “NY Atty Genl praises revised ConEd rate settlement” Reuters News, 5 September 1997. 
40 See http://archive.pulp.tc/O_O97-16.pdf  
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Box 2.3 continued: Summary of PSC Restructuring Orders for Consolidated 
Edison, NYSEG and Niagara Mohawk 
 
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. RETAIL CHOICE: Begins in 1998 for large 
industrial and commercial customers; available for all by Jan. 1, 2000. SAVINGS: 
Immediate 25-percent cut for the very largest industrial and commercial customers. By 
2000, all industrials to save about 13 percent, versus 3.2 percent for residential and 
small commercial classes (many of whom may see no decrease, and perhaps an 
increase). PSC defers final decision on proposed customer charges for residential and 
small commercial classes that would produce net rate increase in some cases. Order 
admits that generation backout rate is "low" (reflects fuel costs and wholesale prices in 
New York Power Pool) but rejects Enron proposal for higher rate of 3.95 cents per 
kWh, reflecting property taxes and higher NYPP reserve margin (18 percent, up from 
14 percent). DIVESTITURE: Company may retain 15 percent of any gain above net 
book value as incentive for sale of non-nuclear generation. Nuclear generation would 
remain with the regulated T&D company. RETURN ON EQUITY: Company assumes 
$2 billion in stranded costs by accepting "very low" equity return over 5 years. 
OTHER: Approves "floating" competitive transition charge to fund $3.6-billion debt 
needed to execute settlement with 16 independent power producers to restructure 
uneconomic purchased power contracts. Exit fees and backup service charges for on-
site generators designed to make CTC nonbypassable. Provides third-party 
administrator for system benefits charge. Set up $10 million fund for employee 
retraining/outplacement/severance. See, Case 94-E-0098, Opinion No. 98-8, March 
20, 1998 (N.Y.P.S.C.). 
 
The treatment of stranded assets was also a contentious issue.  As previously 
discussed, one of the major drivers behind the push towards deregulation was that it 
would provide a fresh start, free of stranded assets.  With the PSC favoring a non-
legislative approach to deregulation, stranded assets became an important negotiation 
point for incumbent utilities.  The major question which needed to be answered was: 
“who should assume financial responsibility for these bad investments --- the 
shareholders of the utility or the utility’s customers?”  Attorney general Eliot Spitzer 
forwarded one popular argument when he commented on the infamous Nine Mile 
Nuclear generation facility in 2001.  He stated that “Customers should not have to pay 
Nine Mile stranded costs. Customers did not choose to make an uneconomic 
investment in these plants.  Shareholders, on the other hand, voluntarily purchased the 
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selling utilities’ stock. When doing so, they assumed the risk that not all of 
management’s decisions would be correct….  The very fact that the plants’ market 
value as determined through a competitive auction is less than the utilities’ cost 
conclusively proves that the utilities spent more for the plants than they are worth.  
The utilities’ shareholders should bear the burden of that fact.” 41   The counter 
argument to this was that, as previously discussed, New York State required utilities to 
sign long term contracts with non utility generators and enacted regulations that 
exceeded the obligations under PURPA (Joskow, 2000).  Also, incumbent utilities 
invested in these generation projects in a regulatory environment in which prudently 
incurred investment would be included in their rate-base.  In Cases 94-E-0952 et al., 
supra, Opinion No. 96-12, the PSC decided that strandable investment would be 
eligible for rate recovery if they are deemed to have been prudently incurred.42 
 
Of the three utilities we examine, Niagara Mohawk was the most affected by stranded 
assets and costs.  There were two main reasons for this.  Firstly, Niagara Mohawk 
commissioned ‘Nine Mile Point’, a nuclear power plant located by Oswego, New 
York.  Nine Mile Point consists of two units with rated capacities of 621 MW and 
1,135 MW, that went online in 1974 and 1987, respectively.43  Both projects were 
plagued by cost overruns and in 2001 Spitzer claimed that "costs at Nine Mile 2 have 
been so high that, ever since it came into service, customers have paid substantially 
more for Nine Mile 2's output than they would have if that plant's owners had simply 
                                                 
41  Comments Of Eliot Spitzer Attorney General of the State of New York, Case No. 01-E-0011 
September 25, 2001. http://www.oag.state.ny.us/telecommunications/filings/ninemile.html  
42 Prudent is defined as “The company's conduct should be judged by asking whether the conduct was 
reasonable at the time, under all the circumstances, considering that the company had to solve its 
problems prospectively rather than in reliance on hindsight. In effect, our responsibility is to determine 
how reasonable people would have performed the tasks that confronted the company.” Cases 94-E-
0952 et al., supra, Opinion No. 96-12.   
43See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/at_a_glance/reactors/nine_mile.html  
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bought the same amount of electricity elsewhere."44  In May 2001, Niagara Mohawk, 
which owned all of Nine Mile One and 41% of Nine Mile Two,45 reported that “it had 
$1.277 billion in Nine Mile One and Two costs on its books, and that after applying 
the proceeds from the sale of its interests and absorbing $123 million of the loss as 
here, it would have $686 million in stranded costs”46  The second main reason behind 
Niagara Mohawk’s high stranded costs was the combination of its obligation under 
PURPA to buy electricity from independent generators who wanted to supply and the 
opening of the Empire State Pipeline in 1993.  This natural gas pipeline, which runs 
from Buffalo, near the Canadian border, to Syracuse, in the Mohawk Valley, 
substantially lowered the barriers to entry that new independent entrants faced by 
allowing easy access to Canadian sourced natural gas.47  This resulted in Niagara 
Mohawk having the largest number of IPPs in its service territory and consequently 
entered into a larger number of long-term contacts, compared to other New York 
utilities.  In 1997 Niagara Mohawk commented that “by far, the single largest factor 
contributing to the company’s higher electric prices was increased payments to 
independent power producers (IPPs) pursuant to power purchase agreements (PPAs) 
containing prices exceeding the market value of electricity. In 1995, for example, 
Niagara Mohawk’s total payments to IPPs exceeded $1 billion. These payments were 
expected to increase over the next 20 years at a rate faster than the forecast rate of 
inflation.”48   In 2002, Niagara Mohawk reported that their total regulatory assets 
amounted to approximately $5.1 billion. Under Niagara Mohawk’s 1997 Merger Rate 
                                                 
44 “Sale of plants would create debt Niagara Mohawk wants to pass $1.2 billion to ratepayers. Spitzer 
balks.” By Chris Iven, April 21, 2001 (http://archive.pulp.tc/Saleof_plants42301.pdf ) 
45 In 2001 the other owners of Nine Mile 2 were: NewYork State Electric & Gas (18%); Rochester Gas 
& Electric (14%); Central Hudson Gas & Electric (9%); and the Long Island Power Authority (18%). 
46From Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State Of New York State of New York, comments on the 
Public Service Commission Case 01-E-0011 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/telecommunications/filings/ninemile.html  
47 The Empire State Pipeline is a subsidiary of National Fuel Gas Company.  It is 157 miles long and 
has a design capacity of 525 million cubic feet per day. 
48 State Of New York Public Service Commission Case 94-E-0098 (p. 2) 
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Plan “a regulatory asset was established that included the unamortized costs of the 
MRA [Master Restructuring Agreement], the cost of any additional independent power 
producer (IPP) contract buyouts, and the deferred loss on the sale of the generation 
assets. The MRA represents the cost to terminate, restate, or amend IPP Party 
contracts. Beginning January 31, 2002, the Merger Rate Plan stranded costs 
regulatory asset is being amortized over ten years, with larger amounts being 
amortized in the latter years. Niagara Mohawks rates under the Merger Rate Plan 
have been designed to permit recovery of, and a return on, the Merger Rate Plan 
stranded costs.” 49 
 
NYSEG was also affected by Nine Mile Two nuclear facility, albeit to a lesser extent.  
In 2000 they sold their 18% stake to Constellation Energy for $123.2 million, a $332.8 
million dollar loss on its $446 million book value.  In total, NYSEG’s stranded costs 
and assets amounted to $645.5 million. 50   NYSEG was able to use the after-tax 
proceeds from its $1.3 billion sale of its coal-fired generation facilities to offset all of 
the stranded costs from its nuclear generation assets.51  The remaining stranded costs, 
which related to NYSEG’s PPAs, are being recovered though the Transition Charge.  
Each month NYSEG calculates the above or below-market cost of its purchased power 
contracts by comparing the market price of electricity with the contracted price of the 
purchased power agreements.  The difference is then either collected or refunded to 
customers through the Transition Charge.52  
 
                                                 
49 Niagara Mohawks Form 10-K 2003 --- Note C Rate and Regulatory Issues and Contingencies.  
50 See http://www.oag.state.ny.us/telecommunications/filings/ninemilesale.html 
51 See http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3718/is_199906/ai_n8859256  
52 This pricing mechanism is more fully explained in NYSEG’s PSC 120 tariff which can be found at 
http://www.nyseg.com/nysegweb/webcontent.nsf/Lookup/120v60/$file/120v60.pdf. 
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Originally it was thought that Consolidated Edison would have large amounts of 
stranded costs.  In 1997 the company estimated with forward-looking statements that 
“on a present value basis, its electric strandable costs could be between $4.7 billion 
and $6.2 billion, including an estimated $650 million relating to its fossil-fueled 
plants; $1.1 billion relating to its nuclear generating operations (including 
decommissioning costs); and $3 billion to $4.5 billion relating to capacity charges 
under Con Edison's contracts with NUGs.”53 However, Consolidated Edison’s actual 
stranded costs were materially lower than this due to the higher than expected 
proceeds from New York City generation facilities.54   As of December 31, 2000, 
Consolidated Edison reported that its net regulatory assets amounted to approximately 
$1.2 billion. 55   In 1997, Consolidated Edison and the PSC agreed on a revised 
settlement that allowed Consolidated Edison to recover substantially all of its stranded 
costs. 
 
2.3 Divestiture of Generation Assets 
For their part utilities agreed to open up their retail markets to competition and to 
divest a proportion of their generation facilities.  This was done either explicitly or 
implicitly by providing incentives.  As a result, the years following the restructuring 
plans saw a flurry of major transactions as incumbent utilities sort to divest their 
generation assets.  For example, consider Consolidated Edison who agreed in 1997 to 
“sell at least 50 percent of in-city generating capacity”.  In 1999, they sold the 842 
megawatt Arthur Kill Generating Station in Staten Island (consisting of three oil- and 
natural gas-burning generating units); the 614 megawatt Astoria gas turbine facility in 
Queens to NRG Energy Inc for $505 million; and the 2,168 megawatts of generation 
                                                 
53 Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc · 8-K · 3/13/97. See http://www.secinfo.com/dn2v.8d.htm 
54 These gains were partially offset by the sale of Indian Point Nuclear plant well below book value. 
55 See Consolidated Edison Form 10-K, 2001. 
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in Queens (Ravenswood Generating Station together with an additional gas turbine 
site) to Keyspan Energy (KSE) for $597 million. 56   In 2001, they subsequently 
completed the sale of Indian Point 1 and 2 nuclear units, and three natural gas-fired 
turbines to Entergy for $502 million.57  Similarly, the consortium of Niagara Mohawk, 
NYSEG, Rochester Gas and Electric, and Central Hudson Gas & Electric sold their 
82% stake in Nine Mile Two for $762 million.58,59 A complete listing of generation 
divestitures by New York State Utilities for the period 1997-2002 is given in Table 
2.1. 
Table 2.1: Generation Divestitures by New York State Utilities   
for the Period 1997-200260  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Note: Book Values are from pre closing data 
SOURCE:  Electric Power Supply Association (2002) and "Wholesale Market 
Issues: Utility Divestiture Process in New York" Gallagher (2006) 
                                                 
56 “Con Ed To Sell Two New York City Power Plants For $1.1 Billion” Dow Jones Business News, 29 
January 1999. 
57  This sale included a Purchase Power Agreement (PPA) in which “Con Edison will purchase 100% of 
IP2's output for 3.5 years on a unit contingent basis at a price ranging from $36-$46/MWh” 
http://www.shareholder.com/entergy/releaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=27954  
58 See http://archive.pulp.tc/html/nine_mile_nukes_have_new_owner.html 
59 The Long Island Power Authority decided to keep their 18% share. 
60 According to the American Public Power Association’s “Compilation of Investor-Owned Utility 
Transactions – Plant Acquisitions” there have been no additional major divestitures by the three utilities 
we follow through 2006. 
http://www.appanet.org/aboutpublic/index.cfm?ItemNumber=2737&sn.ItemNumber=2039 
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When we compare the sale prices of the divestitures with the book value of these 
assets on the utilities’ balance sheets we see that steam and combustion turbines 
powered by oil and gas (e.g. Arthur Kill, Ravenswood and Astoria) sold at a premium, 
while nuclear generation (e.g. Indian Point and Nine Mile Point) sold at a discount.61 
 
2.3.1 Regulatory Uncertainty Surrounding Divestures 
The regulatory uncertainty surrounding the design of mitigation rules in the newly 
created market made the valuation of the soon to be divested generation assets a 
challenging prospect for potential buyers.  In standard Net Present Value (NPV) 
analysis the after-tax cash flows generated by the investment are estimated and then 
discounted back to present day dollars terms using the appropriate risk-adjusted 
interest rate.  In a deregulated setting the after tax cash flows are very much dependent 
on the structure of the newly restructured industry, and in particular the strength of 
market mitigation procedures --- which are inherently uncertain.  For example, the 
New York State market-based trading began in 1999 with a FERC-approved price cap 
of $10,000 per MWH.  Then on July 26, 2000, FERC ordered the NYISO replace this 
cap with a $1000 per MWH cap on bids.  Subsequent analysis in Section 3.2.2 shows 
the large effect a change in the cap can have on the profits of peaking units, which are 
reliant on price spikes to recover their fixed costs. This and other imposed and 
proposed price controls 62  have led Independent Power Producers to allude to the 
                                                 
61 The Oswego plant sold at a discount because in the five years prior its output had only averaged 5% 
of its total capacity (averaging 85 MW a year) because of the oversupply of electricity in the region and 
the expensive cost of running oil-fired units.  See “NiMo cuts third power plant deal with NRG 
Energy”, Megawatt Daily, 4(63), 5 April 1999. 
62 According to the Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc. the following additional price 
controls were either been proposed or imposed between January 2000 and November 2002:  “$2.52 bid 
cap on 10-minute non-synchronized reserve bids; Temporary Extraordinary Procedures Authority; 
Automatic Mitigation Procedure; Retroactive Price Adjustment Proposal; Generator of In-City 
Mitigation in the Day-Ahead market to all unites in N.Y.C.; Creation of In-City Mitigation in the Real-
Time Market for all units in N.Y.C.” “Charting a Course for the Future: New York’s Electricity Markets 
Today & Tomorrow”, Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc. White Paper, www.ippny.org, 
November, 2002, p.9. 
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possibility that they have been the victims of a ‘classic bait and switch.’  In a 2002 
whitepaper the Independent Power Producers of New York argued that “…those 
entities that bid for the divested NYC assets made calculations of what a reasonable 
bid should be based on the rules designed by the PSC for the operation and limited 
mitigation of the competitive marketplace it designed.  Based on that market design, 
the auction yielded billions of dollars for the divested assets.  Unfortunately, the PSC 
and the NYISO have repeatedly and dramatically revised the playing field following 
the commencement of the competitive market…”63 
 
Consolidated Edison’s inconsistent ex-ante and ex-post divestiture stance on market 
mitigation procedures provides an interesting example of an alleged ‘bait and switch’.  
Some have questioned whether the move was a strategic attempt to increase the 
proceeds from the sale of its generation assets by proposing generous price caps and 
then post-divesture, lobby for the tightening of mitigation procedures to help ensure 
lower power purchase and capacity market payments.  For example, in 1998, prior to 
the sale of its inner city generation assets, Consolidated Edison proposed that the new 
owners, or divested generation owners (DGOs), be subject to a $105/kW-year cap in 
the Installed Capacity auction.  This revenue cap was subsequently approved by 
FERC.  In December 2006, the New York ISO filed a petition to FERC based on 
Consolidated Edison and the New York State Department proposal for more stringent 
mitigation measures in the ICAP market, including a reference price of $82/kW-year 
on offers from DGO’s.64  The filing was a result of the failure of the capacity auction 
                                                 
63  See “Charting a Course for the Future: New York’s Electricity Markets Today & Tomorrow”, 
Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc. White Paper, www.ippny.org, November (2002), p.9. 
64 From 118 FERC ¶ 61,182 United States of America Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Under 
the proposal, if a DGO’s offer is more than three percent above the proposed $82/kW-year reference 
level, and has the effect of raising the total market cost of capacity by three percent or more above the 
cost that would have resulted from an offer set at the $82/kW-year reference price, then the New York 
ISO will substitute the reference price. The proposal does not remove the current revenue cap of 
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to clear below the $105/kW-year cap despite 1,000MW of new capacity being added 
in 2006. 65   In 2007 FERC rejected the New York ISO’s filing citing “analytical 
shortcomings” and noting the “the proposal is hardly supported by rigorous 
analysis” 66  --- a point acknowledged by the NYISO board prior to the hearing.  
Consolidated Edison has also been a major proponent for increased mitigation 
procedures in New York Real Time and Day Ahead markets both pre-and post-
divesture.  In June 1998, Consolidated Edison proposed that special market power 
mitigation measures (MPMM) were necessary for New York City as “when certain 
operating conditions exist, local reliability rules and transmission constraints intrinsic 
to New York City may create localized market power concerns.”  FERC concurred, 
approving special market power mitigation measures in New York City in September, 
1998.67  In March 2001, Consolidated Edison filed a proposal to FERC which sought 
to strengthen the market power mitigation measures for inner city generators.  The 
proposal had the support of the New York Public Service Commission but not the 
NYISO.  This lead to a heated exchange between the three parties, with the NYPSC 
criticising the NYISO of ineffective mitigation of market power and the NYISO 
criticising the NYPSC for initiating the problem by approving Consolidated Edison’s 
divestiture plan that lead to highly concentrated inner city generation ownership.68,69  
Indeed it is probable that Consolidated Edison may have received higher sale prices by 
selling its generation assets in large bundles, however it is also foreseeable ex-ante 
that ex-post Consolidated Edison would have the incentive to lobby for increased 
                                                                                                                                            
$105/kW-year that applies to DGOs. If the market clearing price were set by a non-DGO at a level 
above $105, DGOs would have to rebate their revenues above $105.” (p.3) 
65 “NYISO is reviewing changes to capacity market pricing” Platts.com News Feature (2006) 
66 118 FERC ¶ 61,182 United States of America Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
67 84 FERC ¶ 61,287 (1998). 
68 “New York ISO Criticizes Con Edison and New York PSC in FERC Proceeding” Public Utility Law 
Project, 28 June, 2001. http://archive.pulp.tc/html/nyiso_criticizes.html  
69  The NYISO also criticized Consolidated Edison for not signing long term contracts with their 
divested generation owners --- something both Niagara Mohawk and NYSEG did. 
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mitigation.  In any event, FERC rejected the proposal in May 2001 asking 
Consolidated Edison to work with NYISO within the NYISO Stakeholder process to 
formulate a feasible mitigation proposal”70 
                                                
 
2.4 Important Aspects of the Restructured Industry 
In this section we briefly examine some of the important institutional changes which 
occurred due to industry restructuring.  These involve the switch from rate of return to 
incentive regulation; the introduction of a wholesale spot market price cap; the 
Installed Capacity Market (ICAP); and retail competition. 
 
2.4.1 Rate of Return Regulation to Incentive Regulation 
Industry restructuring also changed the way the former vertically integrated utilities 
were regulated. Previously these utilities were regulated using ‘rate of return 
regulation.’ As described in section 2.1, rate of return regulation stipulates the prices a 
regulated firm may charge for each of its products individually.  These prices are 
calculated on a ‘cost-plus’ basis i.e. the price is set equal to actual costs of production 
plus a determined rate of return on capital.  It has been argued that the ‘cost-plus’ 
nature of rate of return regulation leads to so-called ‘gold plating’ inefficiencies i.e. 
firms over-invest in order to increase their rate base. 
 
The restructuring of late 1990s saw the PSC begin using incentive regulation (also 
know as performance-based regulation) due to its superior cost minimization 
incentives.  The electric rate plans (NYSEG and Consolidated Edison Company of 
New York) and the merger rate plan (Niagara Mohawk) are all examples of earnings 
 
70 95 FERC at 61,719 
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sharing regulation --- a form of incentive regulation.71 In such schemes, the firm is 
allowed to keep all profits below a certain level.  If the firm earns over a specified 
higher level, it must return all the incremental profits to consumers.  Between these 
two thresholds the firm and consumers share the incremental profits. (See Box 2.4 for 
excerpts from each distribution company’s rate plan.)  The main advantage of earnings 
sharing regulation over traditional rate of return regulation is the stronger incentives 
for increasing efficiency.  For example, if a firm was subject to rate of return 
regulation, its prices would tend to be adjusted downwards if it reduced its costs, albeit 
with a lag, so that all of the savings are passed onto customers.  If the lag was quite 
short, the firm would have little incentive to reduce costs. With earnings sharing 
regulation the firm is guaranteed to keep a substantial proportion of its savings for the 
length of the contract --- ten years for the Niagara Mohawk merger pate plan. 
 
 
Box 2.4: Excerpts from the Rate Plans of Consolidated Edison, NYSEG and 
Niagara Mohawk. 
 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Merger Rate Plan:  
“The Company’s delivery rates are governed by a ten-year rate plan that began on 
February 1, 2002. Under the plan, after reflecting the Company’s share of savings 
related to the acquisition, it may earn a threshold return on equity for the electricity 
distribution business of 10.6%, up to 11.75% without any sharing with customers 
(12.0% if certain customer outreach, education, competition-related and low income 
incentive targets are met). Half of any amounts in excess of 12%, up to 14%, 25% of 
any earnings in excess of that up to 16% and 10% beyond that are retained by the 
Company. This effectively offers the Company the potential to achieve a return on 
equity in excess of the regulatory allowed return of 10.6%. The return on equity is 
calculated cumulatively from inception to December 31, 2005 and annually thereafter 
for the prior two calendar years.” 
   
Continued on next page… 
                                                 
71 Such profit-sharing schemes are also commonly applied to US telecommunications firms.  For more 
on this type of regulation see Sappington et al (2001).  
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Box 2.4 continued: Excerpts from the Rate Plans of Consolidated Edison, 
NYSEG and Niagara Mohawk. 
 
NYSEG Electric Rate Plan: 
“The PSC February 2002 Order also requires equal sharing of earnings between 
NYSEG customers and shareholders of ROEs in excess of 15.5% for 2002, and equal 
sharing of the greater of ROEs in excess of 12.5% on electric delivery, or 15.5% on 
the total electric business (including supply) for each of the years 2003 through 2006.” 
 
Consolidated Edison Company: 
“Under the 2000 Electric Rate Agreement, as approved by the PSC and as modified in 
December 2001, 35 percent of any earnings in each of the rate years ending March 
2002 through 2005 above a specified rate of return on electric common equity are to 
be retained for shareholders and the balance will be applied for customer benefit as 
determined by the PSC. There was no sharing of earnings for the rate year ended 
March 2002. In 2002 and 2003, Con Edison of New York established an electric 
shared earnings reserve of $49 million for the rate year ending March 2003. In 2004 
an electric shared earnings reserve of less than $1 million for the rate year ending 
March 2004 was established. An electric shared earnings reserve has not been 
established for the rate year ending March 2005 based on results through the end of 
calendar year 2004. The earnings threshold for rate years ending March 2003 through 
March 2005 of 11.75 percent can be increased up to 50 basis points. The threshold will 
increase by 25 basis points if certain demand reductions and supply increases exceed 
targeted projections and by an additional 25 basis points if certain customer service 
and reliability standards are achieved.” 
 
2.4.2 Price Cap and the Installed Capacity Market 
The implementation, and subsequent level, of price caps in deregulated electricity 
markets is another contentious issue. Those who oppose them argue that they mute 
market price signals and endanger reliability by deterring investment in generation, 
especially in peaking units that rely on such spikes to cover their fixed costs.  The 
Australian market, with its relatively high 10,000 AUD per MWH cap, is often 
heralded as a market that encourages investment by allowing large price spikes and yet 
has few market power issues.  Conversely, proponents of price caps see them as a way 
of insulating consumers from the damaging effects of the exercise of market power 
can have on a market. They argue that they are a necessary mitigating strategy to 
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counteract market design problems, load pockets and the lack of demand side 
response.  The California Energy Crisis of 2000/2001 is a dramatic example of what 
can happen when a deregulated electricity market is affected by the exercise of market 
power.  To control the problem FERC introduced a number of declining price caps, 
including a $250 per MWH price cap on August 7, 2000; and a $150 per MWh soft 
price cap on January 1, 2001.72,73 
 
The NYISO currently caps bids into its real-time and day-ahead ahead energy markets 
at $1000 per MWH.  Market based trading actually began in November 18, 1999 with 
a FERC-approved price cap of $10,000 per MWH.  However high prices in New York 
City, despite a cooler than usual summer; a $6000 price spike in the neighboring New 
England market74; delays in New York State's Article X process for licensing and 
sitting new generating capacity; the lack of proven demand-side response 
mechanisms; 75  and various transitional problems with the new market (including 
software problems) saw the NYSIO submit a request to FERC on June 30, 2000 for a 
temporary bid cap of $1,300 per MWH.76  On July 26, 2000, FERC ordered NYISO's 
to set a bid cap of $1,000 per MWH --- identical to those ordered in ISO New England 
and PJM, so as not to undermine the neighboring markets.   Interestingly, the PSC had 
                                                 
72 See http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/chron/chronology.pdf  
73 The implementation of the soft price cap (essentially a uniform price auction below the cap and a pay 
as bid auction above the cap) was less than successful.  Mount and Lee (2003) state “The soft-cap 
auction failed dismally as a regulatory strategy for ensuring that prices in the spot market were just and 
reasonable.”(p.2)  
74 “The contract that set the $6,000/MWh clearing price was an external contract for the purchase of 
energy and was bundled with an ICAP contract. In anticipation of initiating OP4, ISO-New England 
reviewed the forecasted prices posted on the NYISO's web site, which showed advisory prices as high as 
$3,387/MWh….The $3,387/MWh price was revised by NYISO a week later to $331/MWh, and it was 
determined that the forecasted clearing price in New York was the result of flaws in the NYISO market.” 
(p.1-55), Staff Report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on the Bulk Power Markets In the 
United States,  November 1, 2000. ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/mc/cms/cms-0401a.pdf  
75See http://mis.nyiso.com/public/postings/ECA%20Extending%20Bid%20Caps%20ECA20010430.pdf  
76 NYSEG had petitioned the NYISO in April and May 2000 to investigate transitional problems of the 
NYISO administered energy markets.  See http://www.secinfo.com/dVUa2.5j.htm  
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recommended that the NYISO seek FERC approval for a $150 per MWH “soft” price 
cap with the $1,000 per MWH “hard” price cap.  However the NYISO strongly 
opposed the soft price cap, with NYISO President William Museler stating in a letter 
that such a cap would have the effect of “reducing the incentive to invest in generating 
resources in New York.” 77   Museler also predicted that “$150 would effectively 
become a price floor, not a cap, since generators would no longer have a strong 
incentive to offer power at prices close to their marginal costs.”78  While the soft 
price cap was never implemented in New York, Museler’s prediction was to come true 
in California, where a soft price cap was tried in the Californian Market in 2001 with 
disastrous results.79,80  The $1000 per MWH was to expire in October 2001, however 
in response to a NYISO request FERC grated an extension “until the Northeast RTO is 
operational and operating pursuant to market rules as established in the final rule to 
be issued in FERC's RTO market design and market structure rulemaking.”  The move 
was greeted with support from PSC, but condemnation from the Electric Power 
Supply Association who deemed it counterproductive for attracting new investment in 
generation.81  In July 2002, FERC proposed Standard Market Design rules that set 
forth a nationwide $1,000 per MWH wholesale price cap.  The existing New York bid 
cap is therefore expected to continue for the immediate future. 
 
One of the main concerns with the move to deregulation was the effect the separation 
of Load Service Entities (LSEs) and Transmission Owners (TOs) from generation82 
                                                 
77 “New York ISO says $150 `Soft' Price Cap would Deter New Plants, Raise Prices” Northeast Power 
Report, 15 January 2001. 
78 Ibid.  Quote from article not President William Museler 
79 Department of Public Service Pricing Team, State of New York, Interim Pricing Report on New York 
State’s Independent System Operator, (Dec. 14, 2000), http://www.dps.state.ny.us  
80 See footnote 73. 
81 “NYISO Bid Cap Plea Attracts Support from PSC, Brickbats from Others” Inside F.E.R.C.,9 April 
2001. 
82 See Section 2.3 for a description of how incumbent utilities divested their generation assets. 
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would have on the ability to maintain reliability.  In the past, reliability was 
guaranteed through LSEs being required to have a reserve margin of 18% --- a 
relatively easy task as they were able to build generation facilities.  Ensuring the 
reliability standard is met in the deregulated system is a more challenging proposition 
as LSEs while still being responsible for maintaining reliability are separated from the 
generation investment decisions.83  The implementation of the previously discussed 
$1000 per MWH wholesale bid cap also created further apprehension about securing 
the necessary investment in generation. As mentioned previously, the Australian 
Market favored allowing price spikes up to $10,000 AUD per MWH to induce new 
investment.  In New York, the lower $1000 per MHW bid cap lead to the so-called 
“missing money problem”.  That is, if the price in the wholesale market is at Long 
Run Marginal Cost then the generators that are often at the margin (like peaking units) 
will find it difficult to cover their fixed costs.  The Installed Capacity (ICAP) Market 
was expected to alleviate both the missing money problem, by supplementing 
generators incomes by the annual fixed costs of a peaking unit, and maintaining 
reliability, by providing a link between reliability standards and generators investing 
decisions. 
 
The NYISO ICAP Market works by linking LSE, who need to procure enough 
generation capacity to satisfy reliability standards, and generators who have capacity 
to supply.  The NYISO sets a downward sloping demand curve for purchasing 
capacity one month ahead.  The actual price that LSE’s must purchase capacity for is 
dependent on the amount of capacity offered into the ICAP market.  The more that is 
                                                 
83 For a more detailed discussion of the New York ICAP market see Mount (2007) and King (2005). 
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offered in the lower the price per KWH.84 Suppliers bid their capacity into the market, 
and in doing so agree to be available to generate.   There are three different NYISO 
ICAP regions, each with its own demand curve.  The ICAP market clears one month 
ahead. 
 
The original form of the NYISO ICAP Market used a vertical demand curve, meaning 
the ICAP prices were highly volatile85 --- an undesirable property for a market signal 
that was meant to induce investment.  Both the PSC and NYISO agreed and on March 
21, 2003 the NYISO filed a proposal to implementing a downward sloping demand 
curve in the ICAP market.  In this filing the NYISO argued that “[f]inancing of new 
facilities has essentially dried up, and investors do not see a reasonably reliable 
stream of revenues to justify investment in New York generating facilities.'' 86   
However, not all parties agreed with the implantation of a downward sloping demand 
curve, which according to the independent market monitor would increase annual 
capacity revenues to generators by $154 million.  For example, the Electricity 
Consumers Resource Councils argued that “the demand curve looks more like a 
subsidy to current generators as opposed to an incentive for future generators.”87 
Despite detractors the NYISO’s plan was subsequently approved by FERC in late May 
2003.  In its decision FERC stated “that the proposal will encourage greater 
investment in generation capacity and thus improve reliability, by reducing the 
volatility of ICAP revenues.”88   
                                                 
84Note that the NYISO currently has a $105/kW-year bid cap for installed capacity in the New York 
City zone --- three times the annual cost of installing a new gas turbine See 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/handbook/NYISO/5-markets-operated.doc.  
85 For example, if capacity was scarce, the ICAP price was very high, but conversely excess supply 
often drove the price to zero. 
86 “Merchant suppliers back NYISO's new ICAP plan”, Megawatt Daily, Vol. 8, No. 71, 2003. 
87 “Sharp Battle Lines Form on NYISO Plan to Revise ICAP Market Design”, Inside F.E.R.C, 21 April 
2003. 
88 “FERC okays NYISO `demand curve' plan, says it will stimulate new plant construction” Northeast 
Power Report, 2 June 2003. 
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 The performance of the NYISO’s ICAP Market has been widely criticized.  Mount 
(2007) states that “the current performance of this market has been disappointing. 
First, it has not overcome the problem of construction delays, in spite of payments of 
more than $1 billion a year to incumbent firms in New York City. Second, the largest 
firms have been able to increase the market price of capacity and their earnings by 
exploiting market power in New York City.”89  Similarly Mount (2006) states that: 
“Even though generators will be paid over $400 million from the capacity auctions 
this summer (plus payments to an additional one third of the generating capacity 
through existing bilateral contracts), there is no guarantee that these payments will 
lead to improvements in the reliability of supply or reduce the likelihood of blackouts 
in the future.” (p. 1) Mount (2006a) also notes that the New England Independent 
System Operators proposal for their Forward Capacity Market (FCM) “addresses 
many of the problems with the LICAP market design adopted in New York State.”  Key 
proposed differences include: the ability to purchase generation three years in advance 
(allowing new entrants time to build generation facilities); and a low price cap of 
installed capacity (to attract new investment); and high prices in the spot market 
reduce capacity payments (capacity payments are only make whole payments).90 
 
Despite the criticisms, the NYISO have maintained faith that their ICAP Market will 
provide the necessary generation investment.  In their 2007 Reliability Needs 
Assessment (RNA) they state: “If these mechanisms work as intended and continue to 
require resources at the same levels as have existed in the past, they should result in 
the addition of new resources to meet most or all of the New York City and Long 
                                                 
89 See http://appanet.org/newsletters/ppmagazinedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=19300&sn.ItemNumber=0  
90 See Cramton (2006) 
 34
Island needs identified in this RNA.”  However such faith in the ICAP market may be 
unwise.  It is important to note that the major contributors that enabled adequacy until 
2010 were not due to new private investment in generation, but the deferred retirement 
of the New York Power Authority’s Charles A. Poletti generating unit in Astoria, 
Queens, from 2008 until 2009; the New York Power Authority $400 Million 
Expansion at the Charles Poletti Power Station; and the repowering of the 400 MW 
Astoria Power Project. 
 
2.4.3 Retail competition 
Lastly we look at the introduction of retail competition into New York State.  New 
entry gives consumers the choice to continue purchasing their power from either the 
regulated incumbent supplier or the new ESCO’s. 91  The encouragement of 
competition through entry at the retail level was further strengthened in New York 
State by the PSC offering a ‘shopping credit’ or ‘price to compare’ to consumers who 
choose to switch to an ESCO.  Such shopping credits use the following logic:  If a 
consumer chooses to purchase their power from an ESCO, the ESCO assumes 
responsibility for purchasing the power required by the customer, and the incumbent 
supplier is effectively only responsible for the transmission and distribution.  Thus in 
their neutral form, such shopping credits are simply an attempt to remove the 
incumbent supplier’s cost of generation from the bills of customers who choose to 
purchase their power from an ESCO.  The ESCO then charges the customer for power 
it supplies, thus effectively unbundling the price into transmission and distribution 
(incumbent) and purchased power (ESCO).  It is important to note that the shopping 
credit need not be neutral.  Indeed, if the shopping credit is set above the wholesale 
                                                 
91  The New York State Public Service Commission has set up a website (www. 
http://www.energyguide.com/finder/NYFinder.asp) to help consumers compare prices/plans from 
different suppliers. 
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generation costs the shopping credit essentially becomes a government provided 
subsidy to encourage customers to switch from the incumbent to an ESCO. So-called 
“creamy shopping credits” have attracted criticism from some authors, notably Paul 
Joskow (2000) who argues that “these shopping credits effectively increase the 
regulated price that consumers who do not choose an ESP [ESCO] must pay to levels 
above the wholesale commodity cost of electricity and provide an opportunity for 
ESPs [ESCOs] to attract customers by offering discounts…” Joskow also warns, such 
“general subsidies are likely only to stimulate a lot of customer churn, wasteful 
advertising and promotional expenditures, and inequitable distributions of stranded 
cost responsibility, without mitigating wholesale market performance problems.”92 
 
In New York the shopping credits offered to consumers averaged approximately 4 
cents per KWh, which look to be higher than the wholesale load-weighted average 
annual zonal prices observed during the first few years of the market for NYSEG and 
Niagara Mohawk (see figure 3.3), but certainly fall short of being described as 
‘creamy’.93 Indeed, in 1999, Howard Fromer, the then director of government affairs 
of the now defunct Enron Corporation, complained that “I can’t believe that any 
outside marketer is making money in the New York market”94 
 
In any case, retail competition is unlikely to be the panacea in helping to prevent high 
electricity prices.  As Stoft (2004) notes, “the net result seems to be that retail 
competition offers no benefits in reducing wholesale market power.  As it will not 
bring down the costs of generation, it seems to hold little promise of improving 
                                                 
92  See Joskow (2000), p. 3 and 55. 
93 It is interesting that the supplemental “shopping credit” was originally planned to last for two years --
- which according to Competition Plus Energy (2000) was “the period electricity marketers have 
suggested is required to ‘jump start’ the retail competitive market.” 
94 See Perez-Pena (1999) p.37, column 2. 
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wholesale performance.  The slim hope that price competition will save more on 
billing costs than it spends on marketing is a flimsy basis for such a large 
experiment.” (p.29) In this thesis we therefore focus on the wholesale, and 
transmission and distribution sectors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LOWERING OF RATES FOR CONSUMERS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It was stated in Section 1.1 that the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) 
believed that industry restructuring would result in the lowering of rates faced by 
consumers.95  As the wholesale price of power makes up a large part of the total cost 
of electricity, a large amount of literature in this area is dedicated to assessing the 
competitiveness of the wholesale market. 96   While such studies are undoubtedly 
useful, it is important to realize that they tell only part of the story.  A competitive 
wholesale market is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the achievement of 
low retail prices for consumers.  The formation of the price ultimately paid by 
consumers is reliant on the interplay between three sectors: generation, transmission 
and distribution, and retail. Of these sectors, generation and retail are both open to 
competition, while transmission and distribution’s natural monopoly characteristics 
mean that incentive regulation is in place.  Thus, even in the ‘deregulated market’ the 
price customers pay for their electricity is still very much reliant on regulatory policy.  
                                                 
95 From page 28 of Opinion 96-12 State of New York Public Service Commission (1996): “Lowering 
Rates for Consumers:  Market forces overall are expected to produce, over time, rates that will be 
lower than they would be under a regulated environment. As we move toward competition, our 
expectation is that rates overall will be reduced.” 
96 Most approaches seek to detect whether generators are unilaterally exercising market power. For 
example, Borenstein et al (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) use a technique called ‘Direct Analysis’, 
which compares actual prices that are observed in the wholesale market with the marginal cost of 
production of the marginal generator in a hypothetical perfectly competitive market. Similarly, Wolak 
(1998) and Joskow and Kahn (2002), use another technique called ‘Strategic Offering Analysis’, which 
can be though of as direct analysis applied at the firm level (e.g. they examine whether or not individual 
generators are offering electricity at prices which exceed estimated marginal cost or, equivalently, 
whether they do not offer in all the electricity which they could profitably generate).  Unfortunately, 
while direct and strategic offering analyses are theoretically useful approaches, the sheer complexities 
of electricity markets and the limited availability of data make estimating the marginal cost of 
generation difficult.   This therefore casts doubt whether any evidence of the unilateral exercise of 
market power afforded by these models is due to actual non-competitive behavior or because of errors 
in the model. For a more detailed discussion see Videbaek (2004). 
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For example, it matters little if the wholesale market is perfectly competitive if 
regulation is failing to provide the incumbent natural monopoly distribution company 
the correct incentives to minimize transmission and distribution costs.97  The price 
paid by end consumers is also dependent on the competitiveness of other 
supplementary markets, like the capacity market, whose costs are not included in the 
wholesale price.  Indeed, the exercise of market power by generators in a market such 
as the capacity market has the ability to stifle even a perfectly competitive wholesale 
and retail market with optimal transmission and distribution regulation --- a point lost 
on many market monitors who tend to acutely focus on the competitiveness of the 
wholesale market (i.e. imposing price caps), while turning a blind eye to the 
monitoring of supplementary markets. 
 
This chapter seeks to gain a more complete picture of the progress toward the 
lowering of rates faced by consumers by analyzing the behavior of these costs (via 
“total costs to consumers per kWh” --- a proxy for retail prices) over time for three 
major New York electricity distribution companies:  New York State Electric & Gas 
Corporation (NYSEG); Niagara Mohawk (NiMo) [now called National Grid]; and 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York (ConEd).98  The analysis is broken into 
four main sections.  First we look to see if the “average cost to consumers per kWh” 
for each utility has decreased since deregulation.  Upon finding they have not, we 
decompose the “average cost to consumers per kWh” into three important 
components: (i) the premium of power purchase costs over the wholesale price due to 
supplementary markets like the Installed Capacity market (ICAP), (ii) the wholesale 
                                                 
97 This thesis will focus on the wholesale, distribution and capacity markets, and not on the retail 
market.  This is because the effectiveness of retail competition to lower consumer prices has been 
questioned by many authors.  See section 2.4.3 for a further discussion of this topic. 
98 See Box 1.1 for a description of each company. 
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price, and (iii) the cost of distributing the power to customers.  We then try to identify 
how each of the three components has contributed to changes in the total costs to 
consumers per kWh since industry restructuring. 
 
The three companies we analyze were chosen as their geographic and financial 
diversity enables us to investigate the effect that deregulation has had on the prices 
paid by consumers in different locations in New York State.  For example, New York 
State Electric and Gas represents an upstate company that is financially sound in a 
market with relatively low spot prices for electricity.  Niagara Mohawk represents a 
company in a similar market that has serious financial problems due to accumulated 
debt (i.e. “stranded assets”).  Consolidated Edison is located in New York City --- a 
market that has relatively high spot prices and the additional financial burden of 
making substantial payments to generators in a capacity market. 
 
3.2 Average Cost of Electricity   
We begin the analysis by highlighting trends in the “average cost per ultimate 
consumer kWh” of our selected distribution/utility firms over the period 1986 – 2005 
(see Figure 3.1).  When analyzing this measure it is important to first understand the 
methodology used to calculate it.  The average cost per ultimate consumer kWh is 
calculated by dividing the total costs (which is the sum of: fuel and purchased power; 
wages and benefits; other expenses; depreciation and amortization expenses; income 
taxes – operating; other taxes operating; and capital costs)99 by total kilowatt-hour 
sales.  Note that the methodology used by the New York State Public Service 
Commission to calculate the average cost per ultimate consumer kWh dictates that the 
                                                 
99 Data Field and Sales and Customer Data --- New York State Public Service Commission 5 Year 
Book. 
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total kilowatt-hour sales should only include electricity supplied to full service 
customers and not electricity supplied to retail access customers (customers who pay 
for delivery service from the utility and for supply from an Energy Service Company 
(ESCO)).  The inclusion of retail access customers would understate the average cost 
per ultimate consumer kWh as ‘fuel and purchased power costs’ are averaged for kWh 
the utility did not supply.  This is important as in 2004 and 2005 sales to retail access 
customers, totaling 14,143 million kWh in 2004, and 16,848 kWh million in 2005,100 
were incorrectly included in Consolidated Edison’s total kilowatt-hour sales.  This 
mistake was a result of changes in the FERC Form 1, which Consolidated Edison 
mistakenly carried over to the Public Service Commission’s “Financial Statements of 
the Major Investor-Owned [Privately Owned] Utilities in New York State”.  To make 
the 2004 and 2005 statistics comparable with the previous years’ methodology, we 
have removed the kWh sold to retail access customers, as collected from Consolidated 
Edison’s 2005 annual report, from the incorrectly reported total kilowatt-hour sales, as 
reported in the New York State Public Service Commission 5 Year Book.  The 
correction reduces the total kilowatt-hour sales from 440,134,660 kWh to 298,704,660 
kWh in 2004; and from 461,916,960 to 293,436,960 kWh in 2005.101  The correction 
thereby shows Consolidated Edison’s ‘cost per ultimate customer kWh’ to be 
increasing over the last two years (with a particularly large increase in 2005), as 
opposed to the sharp decrease that was incorrectly reported in the New York Public 
Service Commission’s statements (see Table 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 Consolidated Edison Annual Report “Strength” (2005), p.43. 
101 These figures are consistent with the kWh sales to ‘total full service customers’ as reported in the 
2005 Consolidated Edison Annual Report “Strength” (2005), p.43. 
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Table 3.1:  Reported and Corrected ‘Cost per Ultimate Customer kWh’ for 
Consolidated Edison in 2004 and 2005 
 
Reported Corrected
2004 2005 2004 2005
Fuel and Purchased Power 7.11 7.10 10.48 12.09
Wages and Benefits 1.15 1.13 1.69 1.93
Other Expenses 1.02 1.18 1.64 2.00
Depreciation and Amortization Expenses 0.87 0.79 1.28 1.34
Income Taxes-Operating 0.34 0.45 0.51 0.76
Othe Taxes-Operating 1.87 1.80 2.76 3.07
Capital Costs 1.64 1.57 2.42 2.67
Total 14.01 14.01 20.64 23.86  
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that since industry restructuring in the late 1990s, the “average cost 
per ultimate consumer kWh” in nominal terms has increased for Consolidated Edison 
and Niagara Mohawk and remained approximately constant for NYSEG.  These trends 
in costs contradict the PSC assertion that industry restructuring would result in the 
lowering of rates faced by consumers.  To better understand why costs increased we 
decompose the “average cost per ultimate consumer kWh” into three important 
components: (i) the premium of power purchase costs over the wholesale price due to 
supplementary markets like the Installed Capacity market (ICAP), (ii) the wholesale 
price, and (iii) the cost of distributing the power to customers. 
  
3.2.1 Premium of Power Purchase Costs 
It is evident from Figure 3.1 that overall changes in average costs are mostly due to 
changes in the ‘fuel and purchased power’ component of costs.  All three 
distribution/utility firms we monitor have seen their average ‘fuel and purchased 
power’ costs increase since 1997.  For Consolidated Edison and Niagara Mohawk the 
trend has been increasing since deregulation, whereas NYSEG costs have seen a slight 
decreasing trend since 2002.  In this section we  investigate  whether  the  increases  in 
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Figure 3.1: Average Cost per Ultimate Consumer KWH for 1986-2005 for 
Consolidated Edison (top) NYSEG (middle) and Niagara Mohawk (bottom)   
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‘fuel and purchased power’ are mirrored by increases in the wholesale day-ahead 
prices.  We do this to determine if increases in ‘fuel and purchased power costs’ are 
due to increases in the wholesale price of electricity (which would warrant future 
investigation into the competitiveness of the wholesale market), or due to a bottleneck 
between wholesale and distribution. 
  
To do this we compare the average ‘fuel and purchased power’ per ultimate consumer 
kWh with the day-ahead load weighted average price102 from the zones that these 
distribution companies operate in.  The service territories are defined as follows: 
 Consolidated Edison Company of New York “provides electric service in all 
of New York City (except part of Queens) and most of Westchester County, an 
approximately 660 square mile service area with a population of more than 
nine million.”  This corresponds to New York Control Area Zones J (N.Y.C.) I 
(DUNWOD) and H (MILWD).  We choose to focus on Zone J (N.Y.C.). 
 New York State Electric & Gas Corporation. “The service territory…is in the 
central, eastern and western parts of the State of New York and has a 
population of approximately 2.5 million. The larger cities in which NYSEG 
serves both electricity and natural gas customers are Binghamton, Elmira, 
Auburn, Geneva, Ithaca and Lockport.” This corresponds to New York 
Control Area Zones C (Central) E (Mohawk Valley), D (North) and A (West).  
There are also small service areas in F (Capital) and G (Hudson).  We choose 
to focus on Zone C (Central). 
 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation:  “The Company provides electric service 
to approximately 1,600,000 electric customers in the areas of eastern, central, 
                                                 
102 Note that load weighting may not match the load profile the distributions companies consumers. 
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northern and western New York. (from Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 
10-K filing) This corresponds to New York Control Area Zones A (West), E 
(Mohawk Valley) and F (Capital).  Due to the divergence of service areas we 
choose to include Zones A (West), E (Mohawk Valley) and F (Capital).   
 
See Figure 3.2 for Control Area Load Zones and maps of all three distribution firms’ 
service territories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  New York Control Area Load Zones (Source: www.nyiso.com) and 
Maps of All Three Distribution Firm’s Service Territories 
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Figure 3.3 compares the ‘total cost to customers per kWh’ and ‘fuel and purchased 
power costs per kWh’ for each distribution company with the day-ahead load 
weighted average wholesale price for the zone which best matches each companies’ 
service territory for the period 2000-2004.103 From Figure 3.3 we can see that the costs 
of purchased power from the deregulated market for the two upstate companies, 
NYSEG and Niagara Mohawk, are now below the average wholesale price of 
electricity in the spot market.  The reason behind this is that both NYEG and Niagara 
Mohawk signed long term contacts with their divested generation owners (DGO).  For 
example, in 2001 the merger between Niagara Mohawk and National Grid saw 90% of 
the electricity supplied to residential and small commercial customers hedged though 
2008.104 
 
In contrast, the cost of purchased power for Consolidated Edison is still substantially 
higher than the average spot price in Zone J (New York City).105  This is despite 
Consolidated Edison relying heavily on spot market purchases 106  over long term 
bilateral contracts --- a move consistent with NYPSC recommendations, but criticized 
ex-post by the NYISO.  The most plausible reason of the persistent premium of power 
purchase costs over the wholesale price for Consolidated Edison is the large Installed 
Capacity Market (ICAP) payments incurred from operating in New York City.  While 
the capacity payments of individual companies are not available, as they are deemed 
to be commercially sensitive, we are able to get an idea of the magnitude of the 
                                                 
103 Note that the difference between the ‘total cost to consumers per kWh’ and the ‘day ahead weighted 
average wholesale price’ is the ‘total price wedge’. 
104 Electric Energy Market Competition Task Force and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
Comments of the Public Utility Law Project of New York on Task Force Report to Congress, Docket 
No. AD05-17-000, p. 37. 
105 It is interesting that the load weighted spot price in zone C is lower than the fuel and purchased 
power costs of NYSEG.  This could be because of the use of fixed price contracts. 
106 It has been reported that Consolidated Edison purchases 50% its electricity from the spot market. 
Ibid. 
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payments from the “Average All-In Price 2002-2005” graph (reproduced here as 
Figure 3.4) from the 2005 NYISO State of the Market Report.  This figure shows that 
the capacity payments (bottom bar) for the NYC region are considerably higher than 
upstate regions.  Indeed, the capacity payment of around $1.50-$2.00 per KWh seems 
to approximate the size of the wedge between the weighted average wholesale spot 
price in Zone J and the ‘fuel and purchased power cost’ of Consolidated Edison.  This 
serves to reinforce that the price paid by end consumers is dependent on not only the 
competitiveness of the wholesale market but also the price levels in supplementary 
markets, like the capacity market, whose costs are not included in the wholesale price.  
Thus it would be a mistake to acutely focus attention only on the competitiveness of 
the wholesale market, and turn a blind eye to the monitoring of the capacity market.  
Indeed, there are growing concerns about the lack of competition in the ICAP Market 
is costing consumers’ substantial amounts of money, while achieving little from a 
reliability point of view.  Mount (2006) states “By setting a price cap on the 
incumbent merchant generators, the regulators have set an arbitrary limit on how 
much manipulation is allowed in the capacity market.” (p.7) He also points out that 
“Even though generators will be paid over $400 million from the capacity auctions 
this summer (plus payments to an additional one third of the generating capacity 
through existing bilateral contracts), there is no guarantee that these payments will 
lead to improvements in the reliability of supply or reduce the likelihood of blackouts 
in the future.” (p. 1) 
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Niagara Mohawk  Price Wedge
Blue = Total Cost to Consumers per KWh; Red = Fuel and Power Purchase Costs; 
Yellow = Load Weighted Spot Price (LWSP) (Zone E) 
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Figure 3.3: Total Cost (cents/KWh) to Consumers; Fuel and Power Purchase 
Costs; and Load Weighted Sport Price for Consolidated Edison (top) NYSEG 
(middle) and Niagara Mohawk (bottom)  Note:  shaded are uncorrected. 
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Figure 3.4: Average All-In Price 2002-2005 
SOURCE:  Figure 7 (p.9) 2005 NYISO State of the Market Report 
 
3.2.2 Wholesale market 
From Figure 3.3 we can also see that the weighted average wholesale price has been 
increasing in nominal terms for Consolidated Edison’s Zone J, and Niagara Mohawk’s 
Zones E, A and F and in NYSEG’s Zone C.  This indicates the rising wholesale prices 
are contributing to the increases in ‘total costs to customers per kWh’.  In this section 
we explore the evolution of the profitability of various types of generators in order to 
gain insights into who has benefited most from the newly deregulated wholesale 
market.  To do this we estimate the post-deregulation gross profit per year per MW of 
capacity for a selection of hypothetical divested generators for 2000, 2001, 2003 and 
2005.107 For the analysis we use exogenous capacity factors at fixed levels relating to 
the type of generation (base load, peaking etc.).  This is done to help isolate the effects 
the changing shape of the price duration curves and changes in fuel prices have had on 
the earnings of different generation technologies.  In the analysis, the capacity factors 
                                                 
107 Gross profit for the individual generation units has to be estimated as the generation companies’ 
annual reports do not report either regional or plant specific profit information. 
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are converted into the total number of hours the generator was running during the year.  
This figure, together with the assumption that the plant ran during hours with the 
highest wholesale spot prices, enables us to estimate the average price received per 
each generation hour using the ‘Price Duration Curves’ 108  (see Figure 3.5) 
corresponding to the zone the generator was located in. The marginal cost of 
generating is then estimated using the assumed heat rate of the plant together with 
average market fuel costs for each year (from the Energy Information 
Administration).109  Subtracting the estimated marginal cost of electricity from the 
average price allows us to calculate a gross profit per MW of capacity figure for each 
of the plants.110  Note that for all of the analysis, the coal and gas fuel costs are 
exogenous; nuclear generation marginal cost is exogenous and fixed at $20/MWH111; 
and the heat rates of the coal and gas generation are exogenous and fixed at a rate 
consistent with the particular generation technology (i.e. there are no efficiency gains 
in response to changes in fuel prices).  The hypothetical generators were chosen to 
provide a mix of peaking and non-peaking, generation technologies, and locations and 
are based on actual/planned generator units.  They are: 
 
1. Gas Peaking Unit located in Zone J with a Heat Rate 112  of 13,000 
Btu/kWh.  This approximates the Arthur Kill Generating Station: an 842-MW 
peaking plant located in Staten Island (Zone J).  It consists of three generation 
units:  and two fuel oil and gas fired steam turbines and one small ‘black 
                                                 
108 A price duration curve orders prices in descending order of magnitude. 
109 We assume that the generators do not have fixed price contracts for fuel. 
110 Note that this is marginal cost and does not include capital costs.  
111 “Alternatives to the Indian Point Energy Center for Meeting New York Electric Power Needs”, 
National Research Council. (2006) p. 45 
112 Heat rate is defined as “is a measure of generating station thermal efficiency--generally expressed in 
Btu per net kilowatt-hour. It is computed by dividing the total Btu content of fuel burned for electricity 
generation by the resulting net kilowatt-hour generation.” www.coffmanelectric.com/  
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start’113 kerosene-fired gas turbine.  It is owned by NRG Energy Inc.  This 
plant is assumed to generate for 400 Hours per year. 
2. Nuclear Base Load Unit located in Zone H.  This approximates Indian Point 
Units 2:  Indian Point 2 is a 971-MW PWR nuclear base-load plant located in 
Buchanan (Zone H).  It is owned by Entergy Nuclear. This plant is assumed to 
generate for 8000 Hours per year.  
3. Coal Base Load Unit located in Zone C with a Heat Rate of 11,000 
Btu/kWh.   This is similar to Milliken/Cayuga:  A 306-MW coal fired steam 
turbine base-load plant located in Lansing (Zone C).  It is owned by AES 
Corporation. This plant is assumed to generate for 8000 Hours per year. 
4. Nuclear Base Load Unit located in Zone C. This is similar to Nine Mile 
Point 1 & 2:  Two BWR nuclear base load plants located in Oswego (Zone C).  
Nine Mile Point 1 and 2 have capacities of 609 MW and 1550 MW, 
respectively.   They are owned by Constellation Energy. This plant is assumed 
to generate for 8000 Hours per year. 
5. Combined Cycle Unit located in Zone J with a Heat Rate of 9,000 
Btu/kWh.  This plant is based on the planned 500MW Poletti Combined Cycle 
Power Plant which is to be located in Astoria (Zone J).  It is being 
commissioned by the New York Power Authority (NYPA).114  This plant is 
assumed to generate for 7000 Hours per year. 
 
 
                                                 
113 Black start is defined as “an ancillary service which enables the grid to recover from a total 
shutdown. Power station auxiliary equipment must be supplied with power before the main generators 
can be started, power stations that provide black start capability are fitted with stand-by generators 
which can self-start and so energize the grid.”  
www.med.govt.nz/ers/electric/wind-energy/final/final-12.html  
114 For more information see http://www.dmjmharris.com/MarketsAndServices/40/10/index.jsp. 
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Figure 3.5: Real Time Spot Price Duration Curves for New York City (J), 
Central (C) and Millwood (H) for 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005. 
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 Before we begin the analysis it is important to note an important change in the market 
rules for the New York State Electricity market. As discussed previously in Section 
2.4.2, market based trading actually began in November 18, 1999 with a FERC-
approved price cap of $10,000 per MWH.115   However high prices in New York City, 
despite a cooler than usual summer; a $6000 price spike in the neighboring New 
England market; delays in New York State's Article X process for licensing and sitting 
new generating capacity; the lack of proven demand-side response mechanisms; and 
various transitional problems with the new market (including software problems) saw 
NYISO submit a request to FERC on June 30, 2000 for a temporary bid cap of $1,300 
per MWH.   On July 26, 2000, FERC ordered NYISO to set a bid cap of $1,000 per 
MWH --- a cap that remains to this day. 
 
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.2116  presents the gross profit per MW of capacity for the 
hypothetical generators using the fixed exogenous capacity factors and heat rates 
noted above.117,118  From the graphs and table we can see that gross profits fell for all 
                                                 
115 Note that because of the $10,000 per MWH price cap the 2000 price duration curves in Figure 3.5 
have prices above $1000/MWH i.e. they do not  cross the y axis. 
116 For the analysis it is assumed that:  Natural Gas:  1 CF (Cubic Feet) = 1,000 BTUs; Coal:  12,000 
Btu/lb: and 1 short ton = 2 000 pounds. 
117 Note that our analysis only considers gross profit of the hypothetical generators i.e. it excludes 
capital costs.  As different generation technologies are likely to have different capital costs (i.e. the 
capital costs of a nuclear base load unit would be far greater than the capital costs of a gas fired peaking 
unit) we do not compare the level of gross profits between generators directly. 
118 Note the above analysis assumes fixed exogenous capacity factors rather than endogenous capacity 
factors.  We concede that the use of endogenous capacity factors would have been a more realistic 
assumption (e.g. we would expect that as fuel costs increase the capacity factor of the plant will 
decrease all else equal) and that as a result the gross profits may be underestimated.  One argument for 
using exogenous and fixed capacity factors is that there is likely to be a strong correlation between the 
marginal costs of a generator using the same fuel as the marginal generator and the market price.  To 
examine the robustness of the results we repeated the analysis assuming that, as is consistent with a 
competitive market, a generator will generate whenever the market price exceeds its marginal cost of 
production.  For each generator we calculated a hypothetical capacity factor each year by counting the 
number of hours in which our marginal cost estimate from above was less than the price. We found that 
the results were broadly consistent with those discussed in the previous section. 
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of the generators we examine when the $1,000 per MWH bid cap was introduced.  The 
reduction in gross profits was due to large decreases in average prices faced by all 
generators regardless of capacity factor.  While a portion of this decrease in average 
prices can be explained by the bid cap removing price spikes, the decrease is too large 
(especially for base load units) to have been caused solely by such a price control 
mechanism.  It is more likely that the reduction in wholesale prices were due to 
external factors like those highlighted in the 2001 Annual Report on the New York 
Electricity Markets by the Independent Market Advisor to the New York ISO.  They 
conclude that lower overall energy prices were caused by “sharp declines in fuel costs 
over the year and the return of transmission and generation facilities that had been out 
of service during 2000.”119  Most affected by the introduction of the bid cap was the 
gas peaking unit located in Zone J.  Because of their low capacity factors the gross 
profits of peaking units are very reliant upon the small number of price spikes.120  As 
these price spikes were removed by the bid cap the average price faced by peaking 
units was dramatically suppressed, a result which was compounded by the effect of the 
external factors noted above.  The average price received by the peaking unit again 
decreased in 2003, despite increases in gas prices, before increasing in 2005 --- 
although they are still far below 2000 levels.  During 2003 and 2005 the gas peaking 
unit was also hit by sharply increasing gas costs which increased their marginal costs.  
As a result the peaking unit gross profits still remain substantially below 2000 levels.  
The hypothetical nuclear generation units also suffered due to the introduction of the 
bid cap, as they no longer received the high revenues resulting from the price spikes. 
However, because of their large capacity factors the effect on the average price 
received by such generators, and ultimately gross profits, was negligible.  The main 
                                                 
119 See Patton and Wander (2001), p. i. 
120 See Section 2.4.2 for a discussion on ‘Missing Money’ relating to the introduction of Price Caps.  
 54
driver behind the impressive recovery in the gross profits of the nuclear base load 
units in 2003 and 2005 was the large increases in gas prices (see Table 3.3).  Higher 
fuel costs increased market prices by raising the marginal costs of the marginal 
generator --- which in New York is primarily gas-powered.121  Nuclear base load units 
therefore benefited greatly from the situation as the combination of high prices and 
large capacity factors increased revenues, while their marginal costs remained constant 
as they were insulated from the rising gas and coal prices.  Lastly we examine the 
hypothetical coal base load unit and combined cycle base load unit.  As with nuclear, 
both benefited from increasing average wholesale electricity prices in 2003 and 2005.  
However unlike nuclear, such gains were offset by a large increase in fuel costs.  Thus 
neither the coal base load unit nor the combined cycle gas base load unit have 
recovered to 2000 gross profit levels.    
 
It is interesting to note that the nuclear base load generators that have faired the best 
since deregulation were divested at a discount (e.g. Indian Point and Nine Mile Point), 
while the oil and gas combustion turbines (e.g. Arthur Kill, Ravenswood and Astoria) 
that had been sold at a premium have performed poorly.122  From this point of view it 
is easy to see how consumers may feel aggrieved.  The low sale price of nuclear 
powered plants created stranded costs that were ultimately borne by consumers.  From 
the above analysis, these plants now appear extremely profitable, with consumers 
paying the higher prices due to higher gas prices --- but the high gross profits may still 
not be enough to cover capital costs.  It is important to note that if gas prices had fallen 
over this period, the marginal cost of generation (and hence the electricity price) 
would have fallen and nuclear generation would have become less profitable.  
                                                 
121 From Table 3.2 the marginal cost of both gas powered generations doubled between 2000 and 2005. 
122 See Section 2.3 for a discussion on the divestiture of generation assets. 
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Therefore one needs to careful not to make ex-post assessments of divestures 
decisions made in the face of price uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gross Profit /MW 400 Hour Gas Peaking Unit HR13000 (Zone J)
$-
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
2000 2001 2003 2005
Gross Profit /MW 8000 Hour Nuclear Base Load Unit 
(Zone C)
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
2000 2001 2003 2005
Gross Profit /MW 8000 Hour Nuclear Base Load Unit
(Zone H)
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
2000 2001 2003 2005
Gross Profit /MW 8000 Hour Coal Base Load Unit HR 11000 
(Zone C)
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
2000 2001 2003 2005
Gross Profit /MW 7000 Hour Combined Cycle Base Load Unit 
HR 9000 (Zone J)
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
2000 2001 2003 2005
 
Figure 3.6: Gross Profit per MW for Various Generators Using Fixed Capacity 
Factors and Heat Rates 
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Table 3.2: Average Price ($/MWH), Marginal Cost and Gross Profit for 
Hypothetical Generation Plants in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005. 
2000 2001 2003 2005
 peaking Unit HR 13000 (Zone J)
rice $715.71 $211.40 $205.10 $374.03
 Cost $60.84 $53.56 $80.86 $120.12
$654.87 $170.20 $142.90 $281.63
s 400                                  400                                  400                                   400                               
ofit $261,948 $68,078 $57,162 $112,653
our Nuclear Base Load (Zone C)
rice $68.52 $34.81 $47.69 $76.55
 Cost $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00
$48.52 $14.81 $27.69 $56.55
s 8,000                               8,000                               8,000                                8,000                            
ofit $388,160 $118,480 $221,520 $452,400
our Coal Plant HR 11000 (Zone C)
rice $68.52 $34.81 $47.69 $76.55
 Cost $21.33 $20.21 $21.08 $29.97
$47.19 $14.60 $26.61 $46.58
s 8,000                               8,000                               8,000                                8,000                            
ofit $377,498 $116,764 $212,909 $372,662
our Nuclear Plant (Zone H)
rice $97.23 $44.75 $55.70 $89.72
 Cost $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00
$77.23 $24.75 $35.70 $69.72
s 8,000                               8,000                               8,000                                8,000                            
ofit $617,840 $198,000 $285,600 $557,760
our Combined Cycle HR 9000 (Zone J)
rice $138.22 $52.30 $74.12 $114.67
 Cost $42.12 $37.08 $55.98 $83.16
$96.10 $15.22 $18.14 $31.51
s 7,000                               7,000                               7,000                                7,000                            
ofit $672,734 $106,516 $127,003 $220,553
400 hour
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Table 3.3: Annual Average New York Gas and Coal Prices 
2000 2001 2003 2005
New York Natural Gas Prices ($/1000 Cubic Feet) --- Electric Power Price * 4.68 4.12 6.22 9.24
Average Price of Coal Delivered to ($/ per Short Ton) --- NY Electric Utilities 39.11 37.06 38.64 54.94
 
SOURCE: 
Gas --- http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_a_EPG0_PEU_DMcf_a.htm 
Coal --- Annual Coal Report 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005, EIA Office of Coal, 
Nuclear, Electric and Alternative Fuels. 
 
3.2.3 Non ‘fuel and purchased power’ costs 
Figure 3.7 displays the average cost of distributing power to customers per kWh(i.e 
“average cost per ultimate consumer kWh” excluding fuel and purchased power 
costs).  It is interesting to note that these costs have not really decreased in nominal 
terms for Consolidated Edison or Niagara Mohawk since 1997.  NYSEG is the 
exception with a decreasing trend in distribution costs.  Yet the lower distribution 
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costs are offset by higher ‘fuel and purchased power costs’ --- possibly caused by the 
divestiture of generation assets in 1998 (i.e. capital costs have become purchase costs).  
We would hope that the move from rate of return regulation to incentive regulation 
would provide the correct incentives for distribution companies to become more 
efficient in their operations, thereby potentially resulting in a decreasing trend in 
distribution costs --- yet this does not appear to have happened. 
 
To explore the possible explanations for why incentive regulation has not been able to 
reduce the distribution costs of the utilities we monitor, we need to first better 
understand what incentive regulation can achieve and where the increases in 
distribution costs are coming from. Earning sharing incentive regulation attempts to 
motivate firms to increase net cash flows by allowing them to keep a substantial 
proportion of cost savings for the length of the contract.  Therefore it is most likely to 
be effective in the reduction of genuine cash flow items like operating and 
maintenance costs (e.g. ‘wages and benefits’ and ‘other costs’), as opposed to non-
cash expense regulator-imposed items like depreciation and amortization.  Taxes while 
being a cash item can also be assumed to be exogenous and not affected by incentive 
regulation.123 Capital costs may also be unresponsive to incentive regulation due to the 
difficulties firms may have changing their physical capital. 
 
Firstly, when we examine Consolidated Edison we see that increases in costs since 
1997 have come from increases in ‘other taxes’, ‘other expenses’, ‘capital costs’, and 
                                                 
123 According to the 2003 Consolidated Edison 10K report, “[t]he New York State tax laws applicable 
to utility companies were changed effective January 1, 2000. Certain revenue-based taxes were 
repealed or reduced and replaced by a net income-based tax. In June 2001, the PSC authorized each 
utility to use deferral accounting to record the difference between taxes being collected and the actual 
tax expense under the new tax law until that expense is incorporated in base rates. For Con Edison of 
New York, effective October 1, 2004, state income tax is being recovered for its gas and steam 
businesses through base rates.” 
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in the last year ‘wages’. While incentive regulation can not be expected to affect taxes 
(exogenous) and to a certain extent ‘capital costs’, ‘other expenses’ and ‘wages’ are 
both cash items that could be expected to be lowered with incentive regulation.  Thus 
incentive regulation’s failure to decrease the level of these costs is somewhat 
disappointing. Looking at the distribution cost breakdown of Niagara Mohawk, we see 
that there have been increases in ‘amortization of utility’ since 2002, and ‘operating 
income taxes’.  However, since 1998, ‘other expenses’ have decreased --- a somewhat 
encouraging sign for incentive regulation. Finally we consider NYSEG, whose total 
distribution costs have been decreasing.  The decrease in costs is mainly from a 
reduction in ‘depreciation and amortization expenses’, ‘operating taxes’ and a small 
decrease in ‘capital costs’.  This is in contrast to ‘other expenses’ and wages that have 
been static.  The large increase in 2001 was caused by an increase in the ‘amortization 
of utility plant acquisition adjustment’.  So while the situation at NYSEG is positive it 
is probably not due to incentive regulation. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to paint a more complete picture of the progress toward the 
lowering of rates faced by consumers by analyzing the behavior of these costs (via 
“total costs to consumers per kWh” --- a proxy for retail prices) over time for three 
major New York electricity distribution companies.  We found that overall total costs 
to consumers have risen since 1997 for all of the three companies we monitor.  Of 
these, Consolidated Edison’s increases in cost can be traced to increases in the 
wholesale price of electricity; the sustained premium of ‘fuel and distribution costs’ 
over wholesale costs, likely due to the ICAP market; and the failure of incentive 
regulation to reduce distribution costs (in particular ‘wages’ and ‘other expenses’).   
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Figure 3.7: Average ‘Distribution Costs’ per Ultimate Consumer KWH for 
Consolidated Edison (top) NYSEG (middle) and Niagara Mohawk (bottom)   
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Niagara Mohawk’s increase in costs can also be traced back to the increase in 
wholesale prices, although unlike Consolidated Edition there is no premium over 
wholesale prices.  While Niagara Mohawk distribution costs have increased, this was 
mostly due to the increase in non-cash and exogenous expenses.  Cash expenses have 
actually decreased --- signaling incentive regulation might be having some positive, 
albeit small, effect.  NYSEG, whose costs increased and then decreased to lie slightly 
above 1997 levels, was also affected by rising wholesale prices.  However this 
increase has been offset by a substantial reduction in distribution costs --- although it 
is difficult to see how incentive regulation could be responsible for this.  Thus the 
overall evidence is that incentive regulation has not helped lower the costs of 
transmission and distribution companies. We also found that an important factor in the 
increase in the wholesale price of electricity was rising fuel costs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MARKET SEGMENTATION:  CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we focus on whether the New York Public Service Commission’s 
(PSC) second major goal for industry restructuring, maintaining the reliability of 
service,124 has been achieved. One way to assess the reliability of the system is to look 
at the number and severity of blackouts. For example, on August 14th, 2003, New 
York State, together with other major regions in north-eastern United States and 
eastern Canada, witnessed the largest blackout in the history of the United States.  The 
blackout affected approximately 50 million people, with outage-related financial 
losses were estimated at $6 billion USD.  However, while such an event provides stark 
anecdotal evidence on reliability, the number of realized blackouts is far too coarse a 
measure to objectively assess the impact of reform on reliability, especially over the 
short period since deregulation.125  Another approach that can be used to measure the 
state of reliability is to examine reserve margins.  This engineering-based approach 
measures the extra supply capacity that is available to respond to unexpected 
events.126 The NYISO stipulates that a reserve margin of 18% is needed to satisfy the 
proposed North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) of failure in less 
                                                 
124 From page 28 of Opinion 96-12 State of New York Public Service Commission (1996): “Continuing 
Reliability of Service: In order to protect all consumers, any new system involving competition in the 
generation sector must have reliability of the bulk power system as a top priority, including an 
independent system operator (ISO) that must have the authority and means to continue to provide this 
reliability.” 
125 This is because blackouts are large events that occur very infrequently, even when reliability is 
compromised.  For example, an unreliable network might be one that has a major blackout once every 5 
years on average. However with only 5 years of data, it is quite possible that we might not observe any 
outages in an unreliable network over this period. Similarly, we might actually observe one atypical 
blackout in what is essentially a reliable network. Therefore, actual blackouts provide motivation to 
look at reliability but cannot be used to assess reliability directly over such a short timeframe. 
126 The reserve margin is calculated as the amount of Installed Capacity above the Forecasted PEAK 
Load (%). 
 62
than 1 day in 10 years.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, according to the 2005 New York 
Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) forecast, the New York Control Area will 
fall below the required 18% summer reserve margin in 2008.  
                                                
 
In this chapter we choose to apply an economic-based approach to system reliability.  
The approach attempts to measure the degree of market integration using the pair-wise 
relationships between day-ahead zonal spot price data. It is interesting to note that the 
aforementioned 2003 Northeast blackout was caused by transmission problems not 
generation adequacy.127  This event highlights the importance that market integration 
plays in ensuring the reliability of supply. For example, if a network is often 
segmented, the system operator has fewer available generators to dispatch and thus the 
region is more vulnerable to outages — due to the greater chance that generation will 
not be sufficient to meet load.  Conversely, if a market is integrated, it is more likely 
that power can be sourced from various locations and transmitted into the affected area 
— thereby decreasing the chance of blackouts.  It is important to note that even a 
segmented market may have sufficient generation capacity located in load pockets to 
satisfy demand; conversely even a fully integrated market can have reliability issues 
due to insufficient generation capacity. Nonetheless, an integrated market is always 
more conducive to reliability, as a constrained solution cannot dominate the associated 
unconstrained one. 
 
Determining the degree of market segmentation is also pertinent to evaluating the 
process towards the PSC’s goal of lowering rates for consumers.  Given the number of 
 
127 Other examples of transmission based blackouts include:  23 September 2003 when over 4 million 
homes and businesses in Denmark and Sweden lost power for four hours; 28 August 2003 when an 
estimated 400,000 people were without power in London; and 28 September 2003 when 57 million 
people were affected by a blackout in Italy. 
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firms in a pool market, competition is maximized if there are no transmission 
constraints128 or other phenomena that segment the market.  This ensures that every 
firm competes with every other firm, which lessens the chances that market power can 
be exercised. Conversely, if the market becomes segmented, decreased competition 
may result from the diminished market contestability and the consequent increase in 
concentration of ownership and control.129  This is made particularly important due to 
the difficulty that existing empirical approaches (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 
2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; and Wolfram, 1998) have in detecting abuses of 
market power.130 
 
By design, the price at every zone would be equal in a pool market with no 
transmission constraints or losses. However, the existence of these phenomena will 
cause prices at different nodes to vary. The classical economic definition of a market 
is particularly relevant for determining market integration.  The definition advocated 
by Marshall (1961) is that 
 
“the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency 
for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time 
in all parts of the market: but of course if the market is large, 
                                                 
128 Transmission constraints occur when a line between parts of the network cannot transmit any more 
electricity. 
129 It is important to note that even a segmented market may have sufficient competition amongst 
generators to achieve competitive outcomes; conversely even a fully integrated market can have market 
power issues. Nonetheless, an integrated market is always more conducive to competition, as a 
constrained solution cannot be more competitive than the associated unconstrained one. 
130 Such approaches rely on obtaining an accurate estimate of the marginal cost of producing electricity 
by the marginal generator.  This is often difficult due to the inability to extract private cost information 
from generators.   Additionally in times of fuel scarcity, the true marginal cost of producing electricity 
should include an option value, reflecting that the decision to generate today can affect a firm’s ability 
to generate tomorrow. This option value is often very difficult to calculate, requiring a dynamic model 
and real option analysis. 
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allowance must be made for the expense of delivering the goods 
to different purchasers.” 
 
Stigler and Sherwin (1985) provide a relatively simple empirical method to delineate 
economic markets with the use of correlation analysis. They state “. . . parts of a 
market will be more closely integrated the closer the movements of their prices” 
(p.558). Thus if the market were integrated one would expect the prices to be strongly 
positively correlated. A separate market would have lower correlations. 
 
A number of authors including Woo et al. (1997) and Bailey (1998a, 1998b) have 
subsequently used correlation-based analysis to delineate the economic markets that 
are present in electricity markets.131 Both studies use statistical tests to examine the 
pair-wise relationships between prices within the western United States.  For example, 
Woo et al. (1997) use the co-integration of daily electricity price series as being 
suggestive of market integration.132  Once price co-integration had been inferred they 
test whether the relationship (the slope coefficient when the price in one zone is 
regressed on the price at another zone) between the prices is equal to one.  If that test 
is not rejected, the intercept term from that regression should be equal to the actual 
transportation costs in order for competition and integration to be present. Bailey 
(1998a,b) takes a slightly different approach.  In order to better understand the causes 
of market segmentation,133 she uses statistical analysis to see if certain variables (like 
peak and non-peak periods, seasons, transmission line ratings, and hydroelectric 
                                                 
131 There exists a large body of literature on market integration for many products including petroleum 
(Slade, 1986), oil (Gullen, 1999) and natural gas (Doane and Spulber, 1994). 
132  Doane and Spulber (1994) is another example of paper to use co-integration as a means of 
delineating markets --- this time in the market for natural gas. 
133 Woo et. al. (1997) also look for evidence of Granger Causality between the price series. 
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flows) cause lower correlations between locations.134  She also has a slightly different 
view of how to interpret the slope coefficient and intercept term when the price in one 
zone is regressed on the price at another zone.  She believes that if the market is 
integrated, the slope coefficient is less than 1 by an amount equal to the transmission 
losses; the negative of the intercept are transmission charges. If the two zones are not 
integrated, there should be no relationship between the two prices. i.e., the slope 
coefficient should be zero.  We prefer this interpretation to Woo (1997).  It is 
important to note that there exists no definitive threshold for how close to one the 
slope coefficient should be to imply that markets are integrated or segmented, only 
that the market is more integrated when the slope coefficient is closer to one.  
 
This chapter applies an approach similar to Bailey (1998a, 1998b) and Woo et al. 
(1997) to data from the New York electricity market, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the evolution of the integration of the market over time.  Many 
characteristics make the New York Electricity Market an excellent setting in which to 
conduct a study of market integration.  Firstly, as described above, the 2003 blackout 
has raised considerable concerns about the state of the transmission network in New 
York State --- which in turn has lead to calls for increased infrastructure investment.  
Secondly, there exists considerable geographical separation between the large 
hydroelectric generation in the North (Niagara and Canada) and the high consuming 
cosmopolitan region in the South (New York City).  This distribution of load and 
generation means that market segmentation is of particular concern, both in terms of 
competition and reliability.  Additionally, we are fortunate that the New York 
                                                 
134 She finds that high hydroelectric flows, transmission line outages and high demand are likely to 
cause lower correlations and hence a ‘narrower’ market. Having looked at correlations, she then 
analyzes price differences across locations and finds that transmission line congestion causes prices to 
diverge.  Section 4 of this paper follows in the footsteps of these last two papers. 
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Electricity Market has been operating since 1999, thus providing this study with five 
full years of data. 
 
4.2 Data 
This chapter draws on the day ahead price at four (A, C, G, and J) of the eleven New 
York Control Area Load Internal Zones (A-K) from 1 January 2000 to 31 Decemeber 
2004.  In order to keep the analysis manageable we concentrate our analysis only on 
the pair-wise relationships between Zone A (West), C (Central), G (Hudson Valley), 
and J (New York City).135  See Figure 4.1 for locations of the zones.  These zones 
were chosen as the New York City Zone is a major load centre, the West Zone is 
where the large Niagara Falls hydroelectric plants are located; the Hudson Valley 
Zone is close to the New York Zone and the Central Zone is close to the West Zone. 
There exists considerable geographical separation between the New York Zone and 
the West Zone. Of particular interest is whether the New York electricity market, with 
its so called “third-world electricity grid,”136 is becoming less integrated over time. 
 
In the interests of brevity, this thesis will also only focus on trading periods 6 (5:00-
6:00 a.m.) and 18 (5:00-6:00 p.m.). These periods were chosen to represent off peak 
and peak times, which is consistent with Bailey’s (1998a,b) methodology.137  
  
 
 
                                                 
135 Analyzing all possible 210 combinations of the zones illustrates just how cumbersome pair-wise 
analysis can be.  (Note:  this is calculated including all permutations, as AB is not the same as BA.) 
136 The statement “A superpower with a third-world electricity grid” was made in response to the New 
York Blackout by Bill Richardson, New Mexico governor and former head of the Department of 
Energy, 2003.  
137 Woo et al. (1997) used daily volume-weighted average price data. 
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Figure 4.1:  New York Control Area Load Zones  
SOURCE: www.nyiso.com 
 
From the raw time series data for each node we extract 24 separate series of prices, 
each one corresponding to a different trading period, with trading period zero 
beginning at midnight, period one beginning at 1 a.m., and so on. Each series has one 
observation a day for each trading period for approximately six years. As stated above 
we concentrate our analysis on periods 6 and 18 and Zones A, C, G, J --- i.e. A6, C6, 
G6, J6, A18, C18, G18, J18.  We will perform our market integration analysis on each 
full year separately.   
 
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics from the four selected zones for 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, and 2004.  As to be expected the average price and volatility during 
period 18 (5:00pm-6:00pm), the high load period, are higher than the average price 
and volatility in period 6 (5:00am-6:00am), the low load period.  Such time varying 
mean and volatility is very common in electricity markets as price and volatility 
closely follow demand due to the non storability of electricity.  For example, in the 
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early hours of the morning demand is very low allowing low cost base generation to 
be used.  As demand increases throughout the day more expensive generation must be 
used.   Demand then falls in the evening as people go to sleep.  (Figure 4.2 displays 
graphically the mean and standard deviation throughout the day for Zone J (New York 
City) for the period 01/01/2000 to 8/31/2005.) The average price of electricity 
becomes larger the further the zone is located away from the large low cost 
hydroelectric generation in A. This is to be expected as transmission losses, which 
represent the loss of energy (as heat) while electricity is being transported, increase 
with distance.138  It is also interesting to note that since 2002 the average price of 
electricity has increased each year in period 18 and 6 for all of the selected zones.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of the Period 18 (5:00pm-6:00pm) and 6 (5:00am-
6:00am) Zonal Prices in the New York Electricity Market --- 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, and 2004 (1 January – 31 December) 
 
2000 20001 2002 2003 2004
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
a18 45.11 22.18 43.55 28.85 39.62 17.18 55.15 17.83 56.28 14.47
c18 47.12 23.56 46.27 29.19 42.39 18.61 59.46 18.83 60.25 14.82
g18 60.76 53.60 55.35 35.49 50.99 19.66 66.33 20.03 66.46 16.13
j18 66.18 56.68 60.24 36.27 60.35 23.83 81.69 25.91 82.02 25.81
a6 24.81 10.53 25.63 6.91 23.23 6.75 33.33 12.69 34.51 9.76
c6 25.77 11.23 26.50 7.55 24.41 7.52 34.97 13.02 36.33 9.65
g6 28.62 12.14 28.84 8.30 27.19 7.96 37.86 13.74 38.93 9.94
j6 30.25 12.23 30.03 8.39 31.95 10.36 42.59 15.02 42.08 10.81  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 There are of course generators within zones, which will have an effect on this relationship. 
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Figure 4.2:  Mean and Standard Deviation of the Day Ahead Price at the NYC 
Zone (J) for the period 01/01/2000 to 8/31/2005 
 
4.3 Pair-wise Analysis 
In this section we will analyze the pair-wise relationship between the daily price time-
series at different zones using an approach advocated by Bailey (1998a, 1998b), Woo 
et al. (1997) and Videbeck (2004).139 
 
4.3.1 Testing the individual time series for non stationarity. 
We need to test to see if individual raw zonal price time series are non-stationary (i.e. 
have a unit root) for a number of reasons.  First, running an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression using strictly non-stationary data can result in misleading R2’s and t 
statistics (Kennedy, 2003).140  Secondly, testing if two stationary processes are co-
integrated141 is redundant --- two stationary processes will not drift apart without limit 
                                                 
139 As we will see later, the co-integration approach used by Woo et. al. (1997) is not suitable for 
analyzing our data. 
140 Stock (1987) found that if Yt and Xt are co-integrated then OLS estimates of alpha (intercept) and 
beta (slope coefficient) will be consistent. 
141 Price co-integration requires that prices do not drift apart without limit. 
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by definition.  Woo et al. (1997) make this econometric error. They test to see whether 
the raw individual daily price series are stationary and find using ADF test statistics 
that they are.  They then look to see if the pair-wise combinations of the stationary 
time series are co-integrated and find, not surprisingly, that “the ADF statistics reject 
the hypothesis of no price integration for all six market pairs”.  They then erroneously 
conclude that this finding is important as “both De Vany and Walls (1993) and Doane 
and Spulber (1994), assert that rejecting the no price co-integration hypothesis 
suggests market integration.”  Yet co-integration is a technique only used to test if a 
certain linear combination of two non-stationary time series variables is itself 
stationary. 
 
Before we examine the data we will first make an important note, for clarity, on how 
we label the different types of stationarity/non-stationarity in this paper.  They are: 
 
1. Strictly stationary --- the time series does not have a unit root and has a 
constant mean and variance. 
2. Trend stationary --- it is not a strictly stationary process as it has a non-
constant mean and variance, but this trend is deterministic and the series does 
not have a unit root. 142   To make the process strictly stationary we must 
remove the deterministic trend. 
3. Strictly non-stationary --- has a unit root and thus has a non constant mean and 
variance. Such a process can sometimes be made stationary by differencing. 
 
We would expect prices in electricity markets to exhibit trend stationarity --- it is well 
documented that electricity price time series have deterministic time trends including 
                                                 
142 A time series process is trend stationary if after trends were removed it would be stationary. 
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seasonality, day of week, and even time of day effects.143  This is because, as was 
mentioned earlier, the price of electricity is closely related to load, and different 
seasons and days of the week have different load patterns. For example, in summer 
there is an increased use of energy intensive air conditioning that increases load, 
which in turn requires increased use of high priced peaking units/old generators, and 
hence results in higher prices.144 
 
It is also hard to imagine in theory that electricity prices would have a unit root --- and 
hence be non stationary (in the strict sense). Two examples illustrate the intuition 
behind this.  First, if the price process was non-stationary a shock today would affect 
the distribution of prices in the future (in essence moving the entire distribution of 
prices to the right) --- this seems unreasonable in electricity markets as there is no 
underlying reason why a price spike (or even periods of high prices) would continue to 
affect prices far into the future.  Secondly, the competitive process limits the spot price 
from rising without limit --- if the spot price for electricity gets too high, new 
generators will enter the market, increasing supply and thus limiting the spot price. 
 
To see if our individual price series are strictly stationary, trend stationary, or non-
stationary (have a unit root), we will use three techniques: 
1. Visual inspection of the individual time series – a somewhat ad hoc approach; 
2. Visual inspection of correlograms of the individual series; and  
3. An Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root --- a more formal means of 
testing if a series is non stationary. 
                                                 
143 For example, the mean and variance today (in summer) will probably not equal the mean and 
variance that is observed in December (winter). 
144 It is interesting to note that in some countries, such as New Zealand, this pattern is reversed.  This is 
because most households use electricity in winter to heat their homes, while using air-conditioning is 
not overly popular. 
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Figure 4.3 displays plots of the day-ahead price at various zones during period 6 and 
period 18.  A simple visual inspection of these plots suggests the prices are not strictly 
stationary as it does not appear the process has a constant mean and variance.  Indeed, 
there is preliminary evidence of a slight upward trend together with seasonal “wave 
like” patterns.  Day of the week effects, which are difficult to detect in the time series 
plots (due to the amount of data displayed) are identifiable in the correlograms --- 
presented in Figure 4.4. We can see that the correlation between the price today and 
prices tomorrow, the next day, and so on, follows a pattern of general decline which is 
interrupted around every 7th lag where the correlation rebounds.145  The correlograms 
also show that the correlation on the first lag looks substantially less than one and this 
declines for longer lags. This suggests that the process does not have a unit root --- if it 
did the correlation on the first lag would be close to one and would remain 
approximately constant. 
 
While both the time-series graphs and correlograms provide evidence for daily 
electricity prices being trend stationary, they do not rule out the presence of a unit 
root.  We now turn to a more formal means of testing for non stationarity --- the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root.146 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 To see if there is a day of week effect we regress price on the seven daily dummies and 11 monthly 
dummies and then ran an F test that the coefficients of the daily dummies were all equal.  We reject Ho 
at the 1% level for period 6 & 18 prices in all four zones.  
146 The random walk version of the model is  yt=gamma*yt-1+episilont, then the Dickey-Fuller tests the 
null hypothesis that the absolute value of gamma=1.  This simple model can be adjusted so as to include 
drift and trends. 
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Figure 4.3:  Plots of the Day-Ahead Price at Various Zones During Period 6 
(5:00am-6:00am) and Period 18(5:00pm-6:00pm for 01/01/2000 to 8/31/2005 
Notes:  Period 6 is left, Period 18 is right.  Zones from top to bottom are A, C, G, 
and J.  All prices are in $/MWh 
 74
 -0
.2
0
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60  
 
 
  
0.
80
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f a
18
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
-0
.2
0
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f g
18
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
-0
.2
0
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f j
18
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
-0
.5
0
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f a
6
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
-0
.5
0
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f c
6
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
-0
.2
0
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f j
6
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
-0
.5
0
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f g
6
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
-0
.2
0
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f c
18
0 10 20 30 40
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Correlograms of the Day-Ahead Price at Various Zones During 
Period 6 (5:00am-6:00am) and Period 18 (5:00pm-6:00pm) for 01/01/2000 to 
8/31/2005. 
Notes:  Period 6 is left, Period 18 is right.  Zones from top to bottom  
are A, C, G, and J 
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Table 4.2 presents the test results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test in levels with 
14 lags.147  We can see that all of the zonal test statistics lie outside of the 1% critical 
value of -3.43, and therefore we reject the null hypothesis that the series has a unit root 
in favor of the alternative that the variable was generated by a stationary process.  
However including more lagged differences can lead to conflicting evidence on 
whether the series is stationary.  For example, including 40 lagged differences, thus 
picking up some of the seasonal trends, results in a failure to reject the null hypothesis 
at all zones at the 5% level.  It is important to note that STATA allows the addition of 
a linear tread in its Interpolated Dickey-Fuller Test.  If this trend is included then all 
zones are significant at the 10% level with 40 lagged differences (note that the critical 
values change with the inclusion of the time trend). 
 
Table 4.2: Test Statistics Z(t) of the Interpolated Dickey-Fuller Test with 14 and 
30 lags  --- 1 January 2000 to 31 November 2005 
 
Zone/Period Test Statistic with 14 Lags Test Statistic with 40 Lags Test Statistic with 40 Lags with trend
a18 -3.780*** -2.517 -3.392*
c18 -3.505*** -2.387 -3.299*
g18 -4.632*** -2.730* -3.339*
j18 -4.366*** -2.853* -3.761**
a6 -3.794*** -2.391 -3.337*
c6 -3.591*** -2.240 -3.219*
g6 -3.598*** -2.226 -3.164*
j6 -3.450*** -2.038 -3.250*
Critical Values
1% 5% 10%
without trend -3.43 -2.86 -2.57
with trend -3.96 -3.41 -3.12
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level  
 
                                                 
147 This lag structure was selected in order to include day of the week effects.  Even with the day of 
week trend still in the data, we find that the process is stationary. 
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This leads to the question of what the optimal lag length should be when estimating 
Dickey- Fuller statistics.  As Gordon (1995) points out, “if too few lags are included, 
the size of the test changes in an unknown manner and if too many lags are included, 
the power of the test is reduced.” To help address this we apply the common approach 
of using the Schwartz (SBC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to discover the 
optimal lag length in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Greene, 2000 p. 644).  Such 
criterion are used to evaluate the tradeoff between the fit of the model and the 
complexity of the model (number of independent variables).  We will focus on the 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion as “its heavier penalty for degrees of freedom lost, will 
learn towards a simpler model” (Greene, 2000 p.306).  To find the optimal number of 
lags we run a number of autoregressive models, with from 1 lag to 80 lags, and look to 
see which model minimizes the SBC and AIC.148 
 
Table 4.3 displays the summarized results of the optimal number of lags using both 
AIC and SBC as section criteria.  Not surprisingly the SBC selects a model with a 
lower number of lags than the AIC.  If we rerun all the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
in levels with the optimal number of lags (SBC), with a trend, we reject the null 
hypothesis for all of our periods,149 and conclude that the variable was generated by a 
stationary process, without a unit root. Combining the Dickey-Fuller Test results with 
our preliminary analysis would suggest that our daily day-ahead time series are trend 
stationary.  If this is the case it does not make sense to follow Woo (1997) and see 
whether the pair-wise combinations are co-integrated.   
 
                                                 
148 As AIC and SBC measure losses we will wish to minimize their value.  We estimated these models 
in STATA using the VARSOC command (Vector Auto-Regression with optimal lag selection) with one 
dependent variable, which is the equivalent to an autoregressive model. 
149 Without the time trend, we reject the null for A18, C18, G18 and J18 at the 1% level and A6, C6, 
G6, and J6 at the 5% level. 
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Table 4.3: Optimal Number of Lags determined by AIC and SBC 
--- 1 January 2000 to 31 November 2005 
 Optimal Number of Lags
AIC SBC
a18 16 14
c18 16 14
g18 14 7
j18 14 7
a6 78 22
c6 78 22
g6 65 22
j6 45 22
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 OLS Estimation 
It was mentioned in the introduction that if a market is integrated, prices should move 
together across the market – if prices diverged, profit opportunities would arise as 
traders sell electricity at high-priced zones and buy electricity at low-priced zones. 
However, the existence of transportation costs will allow some natural price deviations 
between zones to occur.  In this section we examine the pair-wise relationships 
between zones using an OLS regression.150 If the market were integrated one would 
expect the prices to be strongly positively correlated. A segmented market would have 
lower correlations. Woo et al. (1997) and Videbaek (2004) both use the following 
basic model to help infer if a market is integrated. 
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ti pp ελα ++=        (E1) 
where pAi,t are the prices at node A in period i on day t, pBi,t are the prices at node B in 
period i on day t, and λ Hi is a measure of correlation between the prices. If the market 
is integrated; the slope coefficient (λ Hi) is less than 1 by an amount equal to the 
transmission losses; the negative of the intercept reflects transmission charges. If the 
two zones are not integrated, there should be no relationship between the two prices. 
                                                 
150  As our raw price series is trend stationary we are able to use OLS to estimate the pair-wise 
relationship between prices at different nodes. 
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i.e., the slope coefficient should be zero. 151   Videbeck (2004) also provides an 
economically-meaningful interpretation for λ Hi.  He shows that λ Hi can be 
interpreted as the estimate of the proportion of electricity that the generator located at 
A should sell at a fixed price at node B to achieve the minimum variance portfolio in 
period i.  Values of λ Hi that are close to one indicate that transmission price risk is 
relatively low, as the generator is willing to accept transmission price risk. Such a 
result would indicate that the market is reasonably integrated. Similarly, the further 
away λ Hi is from one, the lower the level of market integration.152 
                                                
 
We use a modified version of equation (E1) in this paper.  Firstly, the seasonal 
patterns (monthly and daily) that are present in the data could introduce spurious 
correlations.  We therefore include various daily and monthly dummies in the model 
so as to eliminate much of the seasonality.  As we are particularly interested in seeing 
if the market is becoming more segmented over time we therefore propose the 
following model: 
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where pAi,t and pBi,t  are the prices in Zone A and Zone B, respectively, in trading 
period i on day t, dj,t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on day i and 0 
otherwise (Thursday is day 1, Friday is day 2, and so on), mk,t is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 in month k and 0 otherwise (January is month 3, February is 
month 4, and so on). 11 monthly dummies are used (the dummy for month 12 –
October is omitted so as not to cause perfect multicollinearity). 
 
151 See Bailey (1998a) for more on this interpretation of the slope coefficient and intercept. 
152 There exists no definitive threshold for how close to one λ Hi should be to imply that markets are 
integrated or segmented, only that the market is more integrated when λ Hi is closer to one. 
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 Equation (E2) is estimated for each year separately (i.e. 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 
2004) --- due to the partial data in 1999 and 2005 we restricted our sample to the first 
five full years in which the market has been operating.  We are particularly interested 
in seeing whether the coefficient  is decreasing overtime as this would indicate 
increased segmentation of the market.  Note that our results will probably be sensitive 
to the roles of markets e.g. ‘A’ and ‘B’ as dependent and independent variables will 
probably provide different results if we reverse their roles in the regression.  Yet as 
electricity usually flows in the direction of Zone A to Zone J, this chapter (in the 
interests of brevity) will only present results for AÆJ, AÆC, CÆG, and GÆJ.  The 
examination of the trend in the coefficient  between Zones AÆJ provides insights 
into the overall integration of the market over time between these distant zones.  We 
also examine the trend in the coefficient for the piecemeal pair-wise combinations 
AÆC, CÆG, and GÆJ, in order to identify where network segmentation occurs. 
H
iλ
H
iλ
H
iλ
 
 Before the results of the regressions are presented, we first test to see if the any of the 
important underlying assumptions for OLS are violated.  In particular we test for 
heteroscedasticity (using graphical inspection and White test), autocorrelation (using 
graphical inspection and the Durbin-Watson d-statistic) and multicollinearity (using 
pair-wise correlations between the independent variables). 
 
4.4.1 Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
In this section we apply the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test and White test of 
homoskedasticity for formal testing of heteroskedasticity. 153  Table 4.5 displays the 
results of the tests and shows that we reject Ho: homoskedasticity in favor of Ha: 
                                                 
153 In order to run this test we needed to have a constant.  We therefore removed dummy d7 and 
included a constant. 
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unrestricted heteroskedasticity at the 1% significance level in all but seven of the tests.  
Table 4.6 displays the results of the Breusch-Pagan test, which rejects the Ho: 
Constant variance at the 1% significance level for all but three of the tests. Our 
regression estimates may therefore be inefficient if we do not correct for the 
underlying Heteroskedasticity. 154   Note that Bailey (1998b) also finds 
heteroskedasticity in her data and corrects for this using the Whites (1980) Consistent 
Estimate of the Covariance Matrix allowing for heteroskedasticity.  We follow the 
same approach (which in STATA is implemented using the robust command). 
 
Table 4.5: Table of White Test for Ho: Homoskedasticity Against  
Ha: Unrestricted Heteroskedasticity --- 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
chi2(102) Prob > chi chi2(102) Prob > chi chi2(102) Prob > chi chi2(102) Prob > chi chi2(102) Prob > chi
A18 J18 235.58 0.0000 317.52 0.0000 225.40 0.0000 163.77 0.0001 143.30 0.0044
A18 C18 109.76 0.2820 149.51 0.0015 117.62 0.1382 114.84 0.1814 170.07 0.0000
C18 G18 270.20 0.0000 271.06 0.0000 278.05 0.0000 298.75 0.0000 204.55 0.0000
G18 J18 299.19 0.0000 283.00 0.0000 245.74 0.0000 222.50 0.0000 188.34 0.0000
A6 J6 231.65 0.0000 152.29 0.0009 184.74 0.0000 167.41 0.0000 259.92 0.0000
A6 C6 117.98 0.1332 182.17 0.0000 112.01 0.2342 163.23 0.0001 151.39 0.0011
C6 G6 247.90 0.0000 100.27 0.5300 205.31 0.0000 152.26 0.0000 106.51 0.3602
G6 J6 158.89 0.0003 154.16 0.0007 159.58 0.0002 176.34 0.0000 254.43 0.0000 
 
Table 4.6: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity Where 
Ho: Constant Variance --- 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
chi2(1) Prob > chi chi2(1) Prob > chi chi2(1) Prob > chi chi2(1) Prob > chi chi2(1) Prob > chi
A18 J18 102.32 0.0000 1476.26 0.0000 312.40 0.0000 117.33 0.0000 77.32 0.0000
A18 C18 245.47 0.0000 47.10 0.0000 261.35 0.0000 143.22 0.0000 56.08 0.0000
C18 G18 155.38 0.0000 1760.52 0.0000 345.83 0.0000 167.36 0.0000 27.68 0.0000
G18 J18 359.21 0.0000 119.27 0.0000 443.29 0.0000 273.59 0.0000 58.66 0.0000
A6 J6 33.51 0.0000 27.33 0.0000 56.00 0.0000 93.79 0.0000 114.69 0.0000
A6 C6 132.95 0.0000 44.61 0.0000 474.28 0.0000 98.04 0.0000 58.97 0.0000
C6 G6 50.53 0.0000 113.64 0.0000 4.07 0.0435 22.46 0.0000 3.42 0.0645
G6 J6 1.84 0.1749 14.02 0.0002 53.30 0.0000 95.49 0.0000 107.45 0.0000 
 
                                                 
154 Note that the OLS estimates are still unbiased and consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
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4.4.2 Testing for Autocorrelation 
Table 4.7 presents the Durbin-Watson d-statistic, a formal test of autocorrelation.  The 
lower and upper critical values for (19,360) are 1.72299 and 1.93257, respectively.155  
In all but one of the tests,156  the Durbin-Watson d-statistic is less than the lower 
critical value, meaning we reject Ho:  no autocorrelation in the residuals in favour of 
Ha: positive autocorrelation in the residuals.157 Our regression estimates may therefore 
be inefficient if we do not correct for the underlying autocorrelation.158  We therefore 
adjust for autocorrelation using the Prais Winston transformation.159  
 
Table 4.7: Durbin Watson D-Statistic for Various Zone Combinations  
--- 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
DW d Statistic DW d Statistic DW d Statistic DW d Statistic DW d Statistic
A18 J18 (19 , 366) 1.3855 (19 , 365) 1.5350 (19 , 365) 1.0978 (19 , 365) 1.2500 (19 , 366) 1.1744
A18 C18 (19 , 366) 1.8405 (19 , 365) 1.2240 (19 , 365) 1.3810 (19 , 365) 1.7160 (19 , 366) 1.3772
C18 G18 (19 , 366) 1.3665 (19 , 365) 1.6253 (19 , 365) 0.8405 (19 , 365) 1.1593 (19 , 366) 1.4824
G18 J18 (19 , 366) 1.5038 (19 , 365) 1.3143 (19 , 365) 1.2568 (19 , 365) 1.6239 (19 , 366) 1.2251
A6 J6 (19 , 366) 1.5725 (19 , 365) 1.4215 (19 , 365) 1.2410 (19 , 365) 1.2983 (19 , 366) 1.3027
A6 C6 (19 , 366) 1.1809 (19 , 365) 0.8884 (19 , 365) 1.5240 (19 , 365) 0.9500 (19 , 366) 1.3619
C6 G6 (19 , 366) 1.6972 (19 , 365) 1.3149 (19 , 365) 1.1954 (19 , 365) 1.6451 (19 , 366) 1.7077
G6 J6 (19 , 366) 1.5442 (19 , 365) 1.5099 (19 , 365) 1.3660 (19 , 365) 1.3048 (19 , 366) 1.4081
4.4.3 Testing for Multicolinearity 
Multicolinearity arises when several independent variables move together in 
systematic ways and can lead to large standard errors for the least squares estimator.160  
                                                 
155 See http://www.stanford.edu/~clint/bench/dw05c.htm  
156 The Durbin Watson d-statistic for A18ÆC18 in 2000 is between lower and upper critical values 
meaning that the test is inconclusive. 
157 These results were supported by examination of the correlogram of the residuals. 
158 Note that the OLS estimates are still unbiased and consistent in the presence of autocorrelation. 
159 For an explanation of the Prais and Winsten estimator see Greene (2003) p. 272. 
160 Note that in the presence of multicolinearity, the OLS estimator is still the Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator (BLUE).  Multicolinearity can lead to large variance of the estimates of the collinear 
variables and the monthly dummies. 
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Table 4.8 presents the mean Variance Inflation Factor for each regression.161  The 
mean VIF’s for all regressions are well within the tolerance ranges from 0.0 to 10, 
signalling no problems with multicolinearity.162 
 
Table 4.8: Mean Variance Inflation Factor 
--- 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
A18 J18 1.77 1.81 1.92 1.87 1.90
A18 C18 1.90 1.80 1.92 1.93 2.10
C18 G18 1.77 1.80 1.83 1.92 2.03
G18 J18 1.77 1.81 1.92 1.87 1.90
A6 J6 1.99 1.96 1.97 1.88 1.84
A6 C6 2.13 1.96 1.97 1.89 1.88
C6 G6 2.03 1.97 1.90 1.89 1.86
G6 J6 1.99 1.96 1.97 1.88 1.84  
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Equation (E2) was estimated with the White (1980) Consistent Estimate of the 
Covariance Matrix (for heteroscedasticity) and the Prais Winston transformation (for 
autocorrelation).  Table 4.9 presents the slope coefficient ( ) from the Generalized 
Least Squares regressions.
H
iλ
163  The closer the slope coefficient is to one, the more 
integrated the market is.  
 
From Table 4.9 we can see the correlations in period 18 between prices in Zones A 
and J have been decreasing since 2001.  This indicates that the overall market is 
                                                 
H
iλ
161 In order to run this test we needed to have a constant.  We therefore removed dummy d7 and 
included a constant. 
162 “The VIF ranges from 1.0 to infinity. VIFs greater than 10.0 are generally seen as indicative of 
severe multicolinearity. Tolerance ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 being the absence of 
multicolinearity.” STATA 
163All of the ’s were significant at the 99% level. 
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becoming more segmented over time.164  By looking at the intermediate pair-wise 
correlations we are able to gain insights into where the segmentation is occurring.  For 
example, prices in Zone A and Zone C are highly correlated indicating that they are in 
the same market.  Conversely, the low correlations between prices in Zones C and G 
in 2000 and 2002, and Zones G and J from 2002 onwards, indicate that segmentation 
is occurring either within or between these zones during those years.165  Furthermore 
the correlation between Zones G and J has been getting consistently worse over the 
last three years, which suggests that New York City is becoming more isolated from 
the rest of the New York market.  This is particularly worrying as this segmentation 
from the rest of the market combined with the falling New York Control Area reserve 
margins discussed in Chapter 1, and the inability of the ICAP market to encourage 
investment in generation infrastructure, could have serious impacts on reliability in 
New York City.  The financial ramifications of outages in New York City are 
exceedingly high as it one of the worlds leading financial centres and home to over 
eight million people. 
 
The results are only slightly more encouraging in period 6, our low demand period.  
The correlations between prices in Zones A and J are more stable, decreasing in 2002 
but increasing in 2003 and 2004.  We can see that the correlations between prices in 
Zones A and C in period 6 have been very high, indicating that these zones have 
remained in the same market.  Once again we witness low correlations between prices 
in Zones C and G in 2002 and between G to J since 2002 --- suggesting this is where 
the market is breaking up.  While the location of this segmentation is hardly 
                                                 
H
iλ
164  An F-test on a pooled regression which included all five years data confirms that the slope 
coefficients ( ) for the individual years are not equal for all the regressions except A18 to C18, which 
failed to reject the null hypothesis.  See Table 4.10. 
165 Transmission losses alone would not be this high. 
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surprising, with a number of well known constraints separating Zones G and J, the 
level of the segmentation during what is a low demand period is of concern. We would 
have expected to see the market more highly integrated during period 6 as the network 
is not transporting a large amount of electricity during this time. 
 
Table 4.9: Coefficient  from the Robust GLS Regressions (Prais Winston) for 
Equation E2 (95% Confidence Intervals give in Brackets) 
H
iλ
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
A18 to J18 0.123 0.753 0.351 0.283 0.268
 (0.082 , 0.164)  (0.532 , 0.974) (0.270 , 0.433) (0.208 , 0.358) (0.191 , 0.345)
A18 to C18 0.973 0.995 0.955 0.971 1.010
(0.949 , 0.996) (0.990 , 1.001) (0.923 , 0.987) (0.934 , 1.008) (0.960 , 1.060)
C18 to G18 0.145 0.794 0.582 0.721 0.776
(0.080 , 0.210) (0.614 , 0.973) (0.459 , 0.706) (0.583 , 0.858) (0.697 , 0.854)
G18 to J18 0.908 0.931 0.624 0.404 0.314
(0.837 , 0.979) (0.844 , 1.019) (0.502 , 0.746) (0.264 , 0.543)  (0.243 , 0.385)
A6 to J6 0.651 0.653 0.258 0.356 0.451
(0.556 , 0.745) (0.574 , 0.731) (0.174 , 0.343) (0.258 , 0.454) (0.329 , 0.573)
A6 to C6 0.969 0.933 0.936 0.979 0.973
(0.960 , 0.978) (0.915 , 0.950) (0.913 , 0.960) (0.959 , 1.000)  (0.939 , 1.007)
C6 to G6 0.714 0.913 0.647 0.917 0.912
(0.610 , 0.818) (0.872 , 0.913) (0.537 , 0.758) (0.886 , 0.949) (0.883 , 0.941)
G6 to J6 0.941 0.801 0.510 0.333 0.496
 (0.912 , 0.969) (0.708 , 0.894) (0.397 , 0.622) (0.214 , 0.452) (0.345 , 0.646)  
 
 
 
Table 4.10:  Pairwise F-tests on Slope Coefficients 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
F(  4,  2109)
A18 to J18 11.590
Prob > F =    0.0000
A18 to C18 2.290
Prob > F =    0.0573
C18 to G18 34.540
Prob > F =    0.0000
G18 to J18 64.570
Prob > F =    0.0000
A6 to J6 11.610
Prob > F =    0.0000
A6 to C6 4.240
Prob > F =    0.0020
C6 to G6 7.300
Prob > F =    0.0000
G6 to J6 51.570
Prob > F =    0.0000
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